Incentive Mechanism of R&D Firms’ Collaborative Innovation Based on Organisational Ambidexterity
From the perspective of organizational ambidexterity, we consider the choice of innovation strategy among R&D firms. By building on contractual arrangements and employing a dynamic game model, we focus on the incentive mechanism of R&D Firms’ collaborative innovation and analyze incentive co...
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| Format: | Article |
| Language: | English |
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Wiley
2019-01-01
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| Series: | Discrete Dynamics in Nature and Society |
| Online Access: | http://dx.doi.org/10.1155/2019/6750123 |
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| author | Bo Song Penghao Jin Liangjie Zhao |
| author_facet | Bo Song Penghao Jin Liangjie Zhao |
| author_sort | Bo Song |
| collection | DOAJ |
| description | From the perspective of organizational ambidexterity, we consider the choice of innovation strategy among R&D firms. By building on contractual arrangements and employing a dynamic game model, we focus on the incentive mechanism of R&D Firms’ collaborative innovation and analyze incentive contracts of benefits distribution and cost-sharing when two firms conduct market-driven innovation (exploitative innovation) strategy and technological research-driven innovation (exploratory innovation) strategy respectively, and collaborate for innovation with each other. We also discuss the influence of exploratory and exploitative innovation effects on decision-making of R&D firms regarding whether to choose collaborative innovation under different incentive contracts. The results show that the effects of exploratory innovation acts as the intrinsic motivation of collaborative innovation while exploratory innovation could be improved to some degree by exploitative innovation. In addition, both investment levels of exploratory and exploitative innovation would decrease (increase) when innovation cost (innovative efficiency) increases. Moreover, compared with a benefit-distribution contract, cost-sharing contracts would not only lead exploitative innovation to realize optimal revenue, but also provide incentives for exploratory innovation more effectively. |
| format | Article |
| id | doaj-art-b931f87af17e4ee4bc98b54d37dda663 |
| institution | Kabale University |
| issn | 1026-0226 1607-887X |
| language | English |
| publishDate | 2019-01-01 |
| publisher | Wiley |
| record_format | Article |
| series | Discrete Dynamics in Nature and Society |
| spelling | doaj-art-b931f87af17e4ee4bc98b54d37dda6632025-02-03T06:10:48ZengWileyDiscrete Dynamics in Nature and Society1026-02261607-887X2019-01-01201910.1155/2019/67501236750123Incentive Mechanism of R&D Firms’ Collaborative Innovation Based on Organisational AmbidexterityBo Song0Penghao Jin1Liangjie Zhao2Center of Management Research, Shanghai Normal University, Shanghai 200234, ChinaCenter of Management Research, Shanghai Normal University, Shanghai 200234, ChinaCollege of Management, Southwest Minzu University, Chengdu, Sichuan 610041, ChinaFrom the perspective of organizational ambidexterity, we consider the choice of innovation strategy among R&D firms. By building on contractual arrangements and employing a dynamic game model, we focus on the incentive mechanism of R&D Firms’ collaborative innovation and analyze incentive contracts of benefits distribution and cost-sharing when two firms conduct market-driven innovation (exploitative innovation) strategy and technological research-driven innovation (exploratory innovation) strategy respectively, and collaborate for innovation with each other. We also discuss the influence of exploratory and exploitative innovation effects on decision-making of R&D firms regarding whether to choose collaborative innovation under different incentive contracts. The results show that the effects of exploratory innovation acts as the intrinsic motivation of collaborative innovation while exploratory innovation could be improved to some degree by exploitative innovation. In addition, both investment levels of exploratory and exploitative innovation would decrease (increase) when innovation cost (innovative efficiency) increases. Moreover, compared with a benefit-distribution contract, cost-sharing contracts would not only lead exploitative innovation to realize optimal revenue, but also provide incentives for exploratory innovation more effectively.http://dx.doi.org/10.1155/2019/6750123 |
| spellingShingle | Bo Song Penghao Jin Liangjie Zhao Incentive Mechanism of R&D Firms’ Collaborative Innovation Based on Organisational Ambidexterity Discrete Dynamics in Nature and Society |
| title | Incentive Mechanism of R&D Firms’ Collaborative Innovation Based on Organisational Ambidexterity |
| title_full | Incentive Mechanism of R&D Firms’ Collaborative Innovation Based on Organisational Ambidexterity |
| title_fullStr | Incentive Mechanism of R&D Firms’ Collaborative Innovation Based on Organisational Ambidexterity |
| title_full_unstemmed | Incentive Mechanism of R&D Firms’ Collaborative Innovation Based on Organisational Ambidexterity |
| title_short | Incentive Mechanism of R&D Firms’ Collaborative Innovation Based on Organisational Ambidexterity |
| title_sort | incentive mechanism of r d firms collaborative innovation based on organisational ambidexterity |
| url | http://dx.doi.org/10.1155/2019/6750123 |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT bosong incentivemechanismofrdfirmscollaborativeinnovationbasedonorganisationalambidexterity AT penghaojin incentivemechanismofrdfirmscollaborativeinnovationbasedonorganisationalambidexterity AT liangjiezhao incentivemechanismofrdfirmscollaborativeinnovationbasedonorganisationalambidexterity |