A new electoral bottom-up model of institutional governance

A new electoral bottom-up model of institutional governance

Abstract The sustainable governance of Global Risky Commons (GRC)—global commons in the presence of a sizable risk of overall failure—is ubiquitous and requires a global solution. A prominent example is the mitigation of the adverse effects of global warming. In this context, the Collective Risk Dil...

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Bibliographic Details
Main Authors: Carlos M. Garrido, Francisco C. Santos, Elias Fernández Domingos, Ana M. Nunes, Jorge M. Pacheco
Format: Article
Language:English
Published: Nature Portfolio 2025-01-01
Series:Scientific Reports
Subjects:
Cooperation
Collective risk dilemma
Evolutionary game theory
Stochastic processes
Online Access:https://doi.org/10.1038/s41598-025-87322-y
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