Absential Suspension: Malebranche and Locke on Human Freedom

This paper treats a heretofore-unnoticed concept in the history of the philosophical discussion of human freedom, a kind of freedom that is not defined solely in terms of the causal power of the agent. Instead, the exercise of freedom essentially involves the non-occurrence of something.That being f...

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Main Author: Julie Walsh
Format: Article
Language:English
Published: Aperio 2019-09-01
Series:Journal of Modern Philosophy
Subjects:
Online Access:https://jmphil.org/article/id/2146/
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author Julie Walsh
author_facet Julie Walsh
author_sort Julie Walsh
collection DOAJ
description This paper treats a heretofore-unnoticed concept in the history of the philosophical discussion of human freedom, a kind of freedom that is not defined solely in terms of the causal power of the agent. Instead, the exercise of freedom essentially involves the non-occurrence of something.That being free involves the non-occurrence, that is, the absence, of an act may seem counterintuitive. With the exception of those specifically treated in this paper, philosophers tend to think of freedom as intimately involved with volition, the judging or deciding activity of the will that votes in favor of or against a proposed action. However, there are two thinkers who endorse a view where not willing constitutes human freedom. Our analysis focuses on the views of Malebranche and Locke. Both invoke a notion dubbed here as ‘absential suspension.’ On this view, freedom is associated not with the power of volition, but rather with this kind of suspension.
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series Journal of Modern Philosophy
spelling doaj-art-b32d0db4903a469c96845547ccfa6c5a2025-01-31T16:07:57ZengAperioJournal of Modern Philosophy2644-06522019-09-011010.25894/jmp.2146Absential Suspension: Malebranche and Locke on Human FreedomJulie Walsh0 This paper treats a heretofore-unnoticed concept in the history of the philosophical discussion of human freedom, a kind of freedom that is not defined solely in terms of the causal power of the agent. Instead, the exercise of freedom essentially involves the non-occurrence of something.That being free involves the non-occurrence, that is, the absence, of an act may seem counterintuitive. With the exception of those specifically treated in this paper, philosophers tend to think of freedom as intimately involved with volition, the judging or deciding activity of the will that votes in favor of or against a proposed action. However, there are two thinkers who endorse a view where not willing constitutes human freedom. Our analysis focuses on the views of Malebranche and Locke. Both invoke a notion dubbed here as ‘absential suspension.’ On this view, freedom is associated not with the power of volition, but rather with this kind of suspension.https://jmphil.org/article/id/2146/MalebrancheLockeFreedomSuspensionPower
spellingShingle Julie Walsh
Absential Suspension: Malebranche and Locke on Human Freedom
Journal of Modern Philosophy
Malebranche
Locke
Freedom
Suspension
Power
title Absential Suspension: Malebranche and Locke on Human Freedom
title_full Absential Suspension: Malebranche and Locke on Human Freedom
title_fullStr Absential Suspension: Malebranche and Locke on Human Freedom
title_full_unstemmed Absential Suspension: Malebranche and Locke on Human Freedom
title_short Absential Suspension: Malebranche and Locke on Human Freedom
title_sort absential suspension malebranche and locke on human freedom
topic Malebranche
Locke
Freedom
Suspension
Power
url https://jmphil.org/article/id/2146/
work_keys_str_mv AT juliewalsh absentialsuspensionmalebrancheandlockeonhumanfreedom