Smith on the practicality and objectivity of moral judgments
The moral problem presented by Michael Smith in his seminal book with the same name consists of three claims that are intuitively plausible when considered separately, but seem incompatible when combined: moral judgments express beliefs about objective moral facts, moral judgments are practical in b...
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University of Belgrade - Faculty of Philosophy - Institute for Philosophy
2024-01-01
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Series: | Belgrade Philosophical Annual |
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Online Access: | https://scindeks-clanci.ceon.rs/data/pdf/0353-3891/2024/0353-38912401059S.pdf |
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author | Strandberg Caj |
author_facet | Strandberg Caj |
author_sort | Strandberg Caj |
collection | DOAJ |
description | The moral problem presented by Michael Smith in his seminal book with the same name consists of three claims that are intuitively plausible when considered separately, but seem incompatible when combined: moral judgments express beliefs about objective moral facts, moral judgments are practical in being motivational, and beliefs are unable to motivate by themselves. An essential aspect of Smith's solution to the moral problem is the contention that moral judgments are both motivating for rational agents and objective. In this paper, I take a close look at Smith's arguments by considering his characterizations of rationality understood as coherence between attitudes. It is suggested that on this understanding of rationality and coherence, it has not been clearly shown that moral judgments are both practical and objective. |
format | Article |
id | doaj-art-b24871bf6f5b422b9a639b33415ff528 |
institution | Kabale University |
issn | 0353-3891 2956-0357 |
language | English |
publishDate | 2024-01-01 |
publisher | University of Belgrade - Faculty of Philosophy - Institute for Philosophy |
record_format | Article |
series | Belgrade Philosophical Annual |
spelling | doaj-art-b24871bf6f5b422b9a639b33415ff5282025-02-05T12:20:31ZengUniversity of Belgrade - Faculty of Philosophy - Institute for PhilosophyBelgrade Philosophical Annual0353-38912956-03572024-01-01371598010.5937/BPA2437059S0353-38912401059SSmith on the practicality and objectivity of moral judgmentsStrandberg Caj0University of OsloThe moral problem presented by Michael Smith in his seminal book with the same name consists of three claims that are intuitively plausible when considered separately, but seem incompatible when combined: moral judgments express beliefs about objective moral facts, moral judgments are practical in being motivational, and beliefs are unable to motivate by themselves. An essential aspect of Smith's solution to the moral problem is the contention that moral judgments are both motivating for rational agents and objective. In this paper, I take a close look at Smith's arguments by considering his characterizations of rationality understood as coherence between attitudes. It is suggested that on this understanding of rationality and coherence, it has not been clearly shown that moral judgments are both practical and objective.https://scindeks-clanci.ceon.rs/data/pdf/0353-3891/2024/0353-38912401059S.pdfmichael smiththe moral problemmoral objectivitypractical rationalitymotivational internalismcoherence |
spellingShingle | Strandberg Caj Smith on the practicality and objectivity of moral judgments Belgrade Philosophical Annual michael smith the moral problem moral objectivity practical rationality motivational internalism coherence |
title | Smith on the practicality and objectivity of moral judgments |
title_full | Smith on the practicality and objectivity of moral judgments |
title_fullStr | Smith on the practicality and objectivity of moral judgments |
title_full_unstemmed | Smith on the practicality and objectivity of moral judgments |
title_short | Smith on the practicality and objectivity of moral judgments |
title_sort | smith on the practicality and objectivity of moral judgments |
topic | michael smith the moral problem moral objectivity practical rationality motivational internalism coherence |
url | https://scindeks-clanci.ceon.rs/data/pdf/0353-3891/2024/0353-38912401059S.pdf |
work_keys_str_mv | AT strandbergcaj smithonthepracticalityandobjectivityofmoraljudgments |