Reverse Knowledge Transfer in Cross-Border Mergers and Acquisitions in the Chinese High-Tech Industry under Government Intervention
The high-tech industry is the main force promoting the development of China’s national economy. As its industrial economic strength grows, China’s high-tech industry is increasingly using cross-border mergers and acquisitions (CBM&A) as an important way to “go out.” To explore the rules governin...
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| Format: | Article |
| Language: | English |
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Wiley
2021-01-01
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| Series: | Complexity |
| Online Access: | http://dx.doi.org/10.1155/2021/8881989 |
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| author | Yi Su Wen Guo Zaoli Yang |
| author_facet | Yi Su Wen Guo Zaoli Yang |
| author_sort | Yi Su |
| collection | DOAJ |
| description | The high-tech industry is the main force promoting the development of China’s national economy. As its industrial economic strength grows, China’s high-tech industry is increasingly using cross-border mergers and acquisitions (CBM&A) as an important way to “go out.” To explore the rules governing the process and operation mechanism of reverse knowledge transfer (RKT) through the CBM&A of China’s high-tech industry under government intervention, a tripartite evolutionary game model of the government, the parent company, and the subsidiary as the main subjects is constructed in this paper. The strategies adopted by the three subjects in the RKT game process are analysed, and the factors influencing RKT through CBM&A under government intervention are simulated and analysed using Python 3.7 software. The results show that, under government intervention, the parent company and subsidiary have different degrees of influence on each other. Subsidiaries are highly sensitive to the compensation rate of RKT. Positive intervention by the government tends to foster stable cooperation between the parent company and the subsidiary. However, over time, the government gradually relaxes its intervention in the RKT and innovation of multinational companies. |
| format | Article |
| id | doaj-art-ae047c8b51c14f4e8107f8cb371938e2 |
| institution | Kabale University |
| issn | 1076-2787 1099-0526 |
| language | English |
| publishDate | 2021-01-01 |
| publisher | Wiley |
| record_format | Article |
| series | Complexity |
| spelling | doaj-art-ae047c8b51c14f4e8107f8cb371938e22025-02-03T01:03:57ZengWileyComplexity1076-27871099-05262021-01-01202110.1155/2021/88819898881989Reverse Knowledge Transfer in Cross-Border Mergers and Acquisitions in the Chinese High-Tech Industry under Government InterventionYi Su0Wen Guo1Zaoli Yang2School of Economics and Management, Harbin Engineering University, Harbin 150001, ChinaSchool of Economics and Management, Harbin Engineering University, Harbin 150001, ChinaCollege of Economics and Management, Beijing University of Technology, Beijing 100124, ChinaThe high-tech industry is the main force promoting the development of China’s national economy. As its industrial economic strength grows, China’s high-tech industry is increasingly using cross-border mergers and acquisitions (CBM&A) as an important way to “go out.” To explore the rules governing the process and operation mechanism of reverse knowledge transfer (RKT) through the CBM&A of China’s high-tech industry under government intervention, a tripartite evolutionary game model of the government, the parent company, and the subsidiary as the main subjects is constructed in this paper. The strategies adopted by the three subjects in the RKT game process are analysed, and the factors influencing RKT through CBM&A under government intervention are simulated and analysed using Python 3.7 software. The results show that, under government intervention, the parent company and subsidiary have different degrees of influence on each other. Subsidiaries are highly sensitive to the compensation rate of RKT. Positive intervention by the government tends to foster stable cooperation between the parent company and the subsidiary. However, over time, the government gradually relaxes its intervention in the RKT and innovation of multinational companies.http://dx.doi.org/10.1155/2021/8881989 |
| spellingShingle | Yi Su Wen Guo Zaoli Yang Reverse Knowledge Transfer in Cross-Border Mergers and Acquisitions in the Chinese High-Tech Industry under Government Intervention Complexity |
| title | Reverse Knowledge Transfer in Cross-Border Mergers and Acquisitions in the Chinese High-Tech Industry under Government Intervention |
| title_full | Reverse Knowledge Transfer in Cross-Border Mergers and Acquisitions in the Chinese High-Tech Industry under Government Intervention |
| title_fullStr | Reverse Knowledge Transfer in Cross-Border Mergers and Acquisitions in the Chinese High-Tech Industry under Government Intervention |
| title_full_unstemmed | Reverse Knowledge Transfer in Cross-Border Mergers and Acquisitions in the Chinese High-Tech Industry under Government Intervention |
| title_short | Reverse Knowledge Transfer in Cross-Border Mergers and Acquisitions in the Chinese High-Tech Industry under Government Intervention |
| title_sort | reverse knowledge transfer in cross border mergers and acquisitions in the chinese high tech industry under government intervention |
| url | http://dx.doi.org/10.1155/2021/8881989 |
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