Nonsense and the General Form of the Sentence
In his paper ‘The Bounds of Nonsense’ Adrian Moore defines sentences for Wittgenstein’s Tractatus as those items to which truth-operations apply, and understands this as a disjunctivist theory. I consider whether this view can plausibly be attributed to Wittgenstein, whether it is compatible with...
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| Main Author: | Michael Morris |
|---|---|
| Format: | Article |
| Language: | English |
| Published: |
he Keele-Oxford-St Andrews Kantian Research Centre (University of Keele)
2025-01-01
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| Series: | Public Reason |
| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | https://publicreason.ro/pdfa/164 |
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