Nonsense and the General Form of the Sentence
In his paper ‘The Bounds of Nonsense’ Adrian Moore defines sentences for Wittgenstein’s Tractatus as those items to which truth-operations apply, and understands this as a disjunctivist theory. I consider whether this view can plausibly be attributed to Wittgenstein, whether it is compatible with...
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| Format: | Article |
| Language: | English |
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he Keele-Oxford-St Andrews Kantian Research Centre (University of Keele)
2025-01-01
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| Series: | Public Reason |
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| Online Access: | https://publicreason.ro/pdfa/164 |
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| author | Michael Morris |
| author_facet | Michael Morris |
| author_sort | Michael Morris |
| collection | DOAJ |
| description | In his paper ‘The Bounds of Nonsense’ Adrian Moore defines sentences for
Wittgenstein’s Tractatus as those items to which truth-operations apply, and understands
this as a disjunctivist theory. I consider whether this view can plausibly be attributed to
Wittgenstein, whether it is compatible with the way Wittgenstein draws the distinction
between propositions (narrowly construed) and nonsensical pseudo-propositions, and
whether it is compatible with the more general philosophy of the Tractatus. Understanding
the Tractatus in the way suggested by the disjunctivist definition of sentences transforms the
way we read the text. |
| format | Article |
| id | doaj-art-a9a59e74960b4e5cbc64cd8ccb403f8e |
| institution | OA Journals |
| issn | 2065-7285 2065-8958 |
| language | English |
| publishDate | 2025-01-01 |
| publisher | he Keele-Oxford-St Andrews Kantian Research Centre (University of Keele) |
| record_format | Article |
| series | Public Reason |
| spelling | doaj-art-a9a59e74960b4e5cbc64cd8ccb403f8e2025-08-20T02:20:41Zenghe Keele-Oxford-St Andrews Kantian Research Centre (University of Keele)Public Reason2065-72852065-89582025-01-0113(2)-14(1)13(2)-14(1)84100Nonsense and the General Form of the SentenceMichael Morris0Sussex UniversityIn his paper ‘The Bounds of Nonsense’ Adrian Moore defines sentences for Wittgenstein’s Tractatus as those items to which truth-operations apply, and understands this as a disjunctivist theory. I consider whether this view can plausibly be attributed to Wittgenstein, whether it is compatible with the way Wittgenstein draws the distinction between propositions (narrowly construed) and nonsensical pseudo-propositions, and whether it is compatible with the more general philosophy of the Tractatus. Understanding the Tractatus in the way suggested by the disjunctivist definition of sentences transforms the way we read the text.https://publicreason.ro/pdfa/164sentencepropositionnonsensedisjunctivismformsyntaxrealismidealismclarity. |
| spellingShingle | Michael Morris Nonsense and the General Form of the Sentence Public Reason sentence proposition nonsense disjunctivism form syntax realism idealism clarity. |
| title | Nonsense and the General Form of the Sentence |
| title_full | Nonsense and the General Form of the Sentence |
| title_fullStr | Nonsense and the General Form of the Sentence |
| title_full_unstemmed | Nonsense and the General Form of the Sentence |
| title_short | Nonsense and the General Form of the Sentence |
| title_sort | nonsense and the general form of the sentence |
| topic | sentence proposition nonsense disjunctivism form syntax realism idealism clarity. |
| url | https://publicreason.ro/pdfa/164 |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT michaelmorris nonsenseandthegeneralformofthesentence |