Nonsense and the General Form of the Sentence
In his paper ‘The Bounds of Nonsense’ Adrian Moore defines sentences for Wittgenstein’s Tractatus as those items to which truth-operations apply, and understands this as a disjunctivist theory. I consider whether this view can plausibly be attributed to Wittgenstein, whether it is compatible with...
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| Main Author: | |
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| Format: | Article |
| Language: | English |
| Published: |
he Keele-Oxford-St Andrews Kantian Research Centre (University of Keele)
2025-01-01
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| Series: | Public Reason |
| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | https://publicreason.ro/pdfa/164 |
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| Summary: | In his paper ‘The Bounds of Nonsense’ Adrian Moore defines sentences for
Wittgenstein’s Tractatus as those items to which truth-operations apply, and understands
this as a disjunctivist theory. I consider whether this view can plausibly be attributed to
Wittgenstein, whether it is compatible with the way Wittgenstein draws the distinction
between propositions (narrowly construed) and nonsensical pseudo-propositions, and
whether it is compatible with the more general philosophy of the Tractatus. Understanding
the Tractatus in the way suggested by the disjunctivist definition of sentences transforms the
way we read the text. |
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| ISSN: | 2065-7285 2065-8958 |