Self-serving regret: experimental evidence from a reciprocity game

Abstract Self-serving bias is a pervasive tendency in human behavior. Our study aimed to explore its manifestations in belief formation and the resulting behavior by using a three-stage reciprocity game that incorporated belief elicitation and regret option (N = 256). Specifically, we examined the p...

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Main Authors: Zeng Lian, Xin Shen, Jie Zheng
Format: Article
Language:English
Published: Springer Nature 2025-01-01
Series:Humanities & Social Sciences Communications
Online Access:https://doi.org/10.1057/s41599-024-04314-5
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author Zeng Lian
Xin Shen
Jie Zheng
author_facet Zeng Lian
Xin Shen
Jie Zheng
author_sort Zeng Lian
collection DOAJ
description Abstract Self-serving bias is a pervasive tendency in human behavior. Our study aimed to explore its manifestations in belief formation and the resulting behavior by using a three-stage reciprocity game that incorporated belief elicitation and regret option (N = 256). Specifically, we examined the post-decision regret of the recipients (reciprocators). The asymmetry between upward and downward adjustments by the reciprocators indicates a self-serving pattern: Reciprocators who underestimated the allocated amount are less likely to make an upward adjustment compared to the likelihood of a downward adjustment made by those who overestimated the allocated amount. This behavioral pattern is robust in both estimation and allocation biases, and across both extensive and intensive margins. Additionally, we investigated whether individuals form self-serving beliefs to justify their selfish actions but find no statistical evidence supporting this notion. Together, these findings contribute to the literature on self-serving bias by providing a lens to view beliefs and regret better.
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institution Kabale University
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language English
publishDate 2025-01-01
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series Humanities & Social Sciences Communications
spelling doaj-art-a89c7f1d56774ed0bc592c1515a8745f2025-01-26T12:20:37ZengSpringer NatureHumanities & Social Sciences Communications2662-99922025-01-0112111010.1057/s41599-024-04314-5Self-serving regret: experimental evidence from a reciprocity gameZeng Lian0Xin Shen1Jie Zheng2International Business School, Beijing Foreign Studies UniversityInternational Business School, Beijing Foreign Studies UniversityCenter for Economic Research, Shandong UniversityAbstract Self-serving bias is a pervasive tendency in human behavior. Our study aimed to explore its manifestations in belief formation and the resulting behavior by using a three-stage reciprocity game that incorporated belief elicitation and regret option (N = 256). Specifically, we examined the post-decision regret of the recipients (reciprocators). The asymmetry between upward and downward adjustments by the reciprocators indicates a self-serving pattern: Reciprocators who underestimated the allocated amount are less likely to make an upward adjustment compared to the likelihood of a downward adjustment made by those who overestimated the allocated amount. This behavioral pattern is robust in both estimation and allocation biases, and across both extensive and intensive margins. Additionally, we investigated whether individuals form self-serving beliefs to justify their selfish actions but find no statistical evidence supporting this notion. Together, these findings contribute to the literature on self-serving bias by providing a lens to view beliefs and regret better.https://doi.org/10.1057/s41599-024-04314-5
spellingShingle Zeng Lian
Xin Shen
Jie Zheng
Self-serving regret: experimental evidence from a reciprocity game
Humanities & Social Sciences Communications
title Self-serving regret: experimental evidence from a reciprocity game
title_full Self-serving regret: experimental evidence from a reciprocity game
title_fullStr Self-serving regret: experimental evidence from a reciprocity game
title_full_unstemmed Self-serving regret: experimental evidence from a reciprocity game
title_short Self-serving regret: experimental evidence from a reciprocity game
title_sort self serving regret experimental evidence from a reciprocity game
url https://doi.org/10.1057/s41599-024-04314-5
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AT jiezheng selfservingregretexperimentalevidencefromareciprocitygame