Inconsistency, Paraconsistency and ?-Inconsistency
In this paper I’ll explore the relation between ?-inconsistency and plain inconsistency, in the context of theories that intend to capture semantic concepts. In particular, I’ll focus on two very well known inconsistent but non-trivial theories of truth: LP and STTT. Both have the interesting featu...
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| Main Author: | |
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| Format: | Article |
| Language: | English |
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Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina
2018-08-01
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| Series: | Principia: An International Journal of Epistemology |
| Online Access: | https://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/principia/article/view/58640 |
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| Summary: | In this paper I’ll explore the relation between ?-inconsistency and plain inconsistency, in the context of theories that intend to capture semantic concepts. In particular, I’ll focus on two very well known inconsistent but non-trivial theories of truth: LP and STTT. Both have the interesting feature of being able to handle semantic and arithmetic concepts, maintaining the standard model. However, it can be easily shown that both theories are ?- inconsistent. Although usually a theory of truth is generally expected to be ?-consistent, all conceptual concerns don’t apply to inconsistent theories. Finally, I’ll explore if it’s possible to have an inconsistent, but?-consistent theory of truth, restricting my analysis to substructural theories.
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| ISSN: | 1808-1711 |