Food Safety Risk Communication between the Food Regulator and Consumer in China: An Evolutionary Game Perspective
Food safety risk communication has attracted widespread attention in China. The government is the leader in food risk communication. It has even more impact on consumers’ willingness to communicate food risk. Thus, this paper constructs a risk communication game model composed of the central governm...
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Main Authors: | Ying Zhu, May Chu, Xiaowei Wen, Yiqin Wang |
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Format: | Article |
Language: | English |
Published: |
Wiley
2021-01-01
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Series: | Complexity |
Online Access: | http://dx.doi.org/10.1155/2021/9933796 |
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