A Stackelberg-based repurchase strategy for rail freight options (BRFO).

This study presents a novel Buyback Rail Freight Option (BRFO), leveraging Stackelberg game theory to enhance the strategic management of rail freight transactions. By integrating traditional buyback theory with a multi-phase trigeminal tree pricing model and parameter identification through a nonpa...

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Bibliographic Details
Main Authors: Qi Shen, Tingyue Kuang, Jingwei Guo
Format: Article
Language:English
Published: Public Library of Science (PLoS) 2024-01-01
Series:PLoS ONE
Online Access:https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0307215
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Summary:This study presents a novel Buyback Rail Freight Option (BRFO), leveraging Stackelberg game theory to enhance the strategic management of rail freight transactions. By integrating traditional buyback theory with a multi-phase trigeminal tree pricing model and parameter identification through a nonparametric Ito stochastic method, the research addresses key challenges of information asymmetry and market uncertainty. The proposed methodology emphasizes dynamic pricing strategies and market adaptation, constructing a Nash equilibrium framework within railway freight pricing. The findings suggest significant strategic benefits for railway enterprises, positioning BRFO as a crucial tool for improving competitiveness in the face of alternative transport options.
ISSN:1932-6203