Pricing Strategy and Carbon Emission Abatement under Cap-and-Trade Regulation Considering Social Learning
In an uncertainty market, social learning plays a significant role in obtaining information to make better decisions. Under cap-and-trade regulation, this paper aims to investigate firms’ pricing and carbon emission abatement issues considering the impact of social learning. This paper establishes a...
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| Format: | Article |
| Language: | English |
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Wiley
2019-01-01
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| Series: | Discrete Dynamics in Nature and Society |
| Online Access: | http://dx.doi.org/10.1155/2019/9549014 |
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| _version_ | 1832558114943008768 |
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| author | Bin Chen Man Yu |
| author_facet | Bin Chen Man Yu |
| author_sort | Bin Chen |
| collection | DOAJ |
| description | In an uncertainty market, social learning plays a significant role in obtaining information to make better decisions. Under cap-and-trade regulation, this paper aims to investigate firms’ pricing and carbon emission abatement issues considering the impact of social learning. This paper establishes a two-period model in a market consisting of a manufacturer and heterogeneous consumers. The manufacturer produces two alternatives (ordinary product and low-carbon product) and makes decisions on sales prices and carbon emission abatement levels. Consumers make decisions on whether and which product to buy. Consumers are not sure about their valuations of products and have the opportunity to discover their true valuation by social learning. The results show that the emission abatement level on ordinary product is affected by the pricing strategy for both types of products. However, the emission abatement level on low-carbon product is only affected by its own pricing strategy. It also shows that social learning lowers the emission abatement level on ordinary product, whereas it improves the emission abatement level on low-carbon product when charging a high price for low-carbon product. Moreover, the price of ordinary product in period 1 is no less than that in period 2. In contrast, the price of low-carbon product in period 2 is higher than that in period 1. |
| format | Article |
| id | doaj-art-8c9441831f4c4de7b94eb7234f32017e |
| institution | Kabale University |
| issn | 1026-0226 1607-887X |
| language | English |
| publishDate | 2019-01-01 |
| publisher | Wiley |
| record_format | Article |
| series | Discrete Dynamics in Nature and Society |
| spelling | doaj-art-8c9441831f4c4de7b94eb7234f32017e2025-02-03T01:33:17ZengWileyDiscrete Dynamics in Nature and Society1026-02261607-887X2019-01-01201910.1155/2019/95490149549014Pricing Strategy and Carbon Emission Abatement under Cap-and-Trade Regulation Considering Social LearningBin Chen0Man Yu1School of Economics and Trade, Hunan University, Changsha 410006, ChinaSchool of Economics and Trade, Hunan University, Changsha 410006, ChinaIn an uncertainty market, social learning plays a significant role in obtaining information to make better decisions. Under cap-and-trade regulation, this paper aims to investigate firms’ pricing and carbon emission abatement issues considering the impact of social learning. This paper establishes a two-period model in a market consisting of a manufacturer and heterogeneous consumers. The manufacturer produces two alternatives (ordinary product and low-carbon product) and makes decisions on sales prices and carbon emission abatement levels. Consumers make decisions on whether and which product to buy. Consumers are not sure about their valuations of products and have the opportunity to discover their true valuation by social learning. The results show that the emission abatement level on ordinary product is affected by the pricing strategy for both types of products. However, the emission abatement level on low-carbon product is only affected by its own pricing strategy. It also shows that social learning lowers the emission abatement level on ordinary product, whereas it improves the emission abatement level on low-carbon product when charging a high price for low-carbon product. Moreover, the price of ordinary product in period 1 is no less than that in period 2. In contrast, the price of low-carbon product in period 2 is higher than that in period 1.http://dx.doi.org/10.1155/2019/9549014 |
| spellingShingle | Bin Chen Man Yu Pricing Strategy and Carbon Emission Abatement under Cap-and-Trade Regulation Considering Social Learning Discrete Dynamics in Nature and Society |
| title | Pricing Strategy and Carbon Emission Abatement under Cap-and-Trade Regulation Considering Social Learning |
| title_full | Pricing Strategy and Carbon Emission Abatement under Cap-and-Trade Regulation Considering Social Learning |
| title_fullStr | Pricing Strategy and Carbon Emission Abatement under Cap-and-Trade Regulation Considering Social Learning |
| title_full_unstemmed | Pricing Strategy and Carbon Emission Abatement under Cap-and-Trade Regulation Considering Social Learning |
| title_short | Pricing Strategy and Carbon Emission Abatement under Cap-and-Trade Regulation Considering Social Learning |
| title_sort | pricing strategy and carbon emission abatement under cap and trade regulation considering social learning |
| url | http://dx.doi.org/10.1155/2019/9549014 |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT binchen pricingstrategyandcarbonemissionabatementundercapandtraderegulationconsideringsociallearning AT manyu pricingstrategyandcarbonemissionabatementundercapandtraderegulationconsideringsociallearning |