A New Sensors-Based Covert Channel on Android

Covert channels are not new in computing systems, and have been studied since their first definition four decades ago. New platforms invoke thorough investigations to assess their security. Now is the time for Android platform to analyze its security model, in particular the two key principles: proc...

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Main Authors: Ahmed Al-Haiqi, Mahamod Ismail, Rosdiadee Nordin
Format: Article
Language:English
Published: Wiley 2014-01-01
Series:The Scientific World Journal
Online Access:http://dx.doi.org/10.1155/2014/969628
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author Ahmed Al-Haiqi
Mahamod Ismail
Rosdiadee Nordin
author_facet Ahmed Al-Haiqi
Mahamod Ismail
Rosdiadee Nordin
author_sort Ahmed Al-Haiqi
collection DOAJ
description Covert channels are not new in computing systems, and have been studied since their first definition four decades ago. New platforms invoke thorough investigations to assess their security. Now is the time for Android platform to analyze its security model, in particular the two key principles: process-isolation and the permissions system. Aside from all sorts of malware, one threat proved intractable by current protection solutions, that is, collusion attacks involving two applications communicating over covert channels. Still no universal solution can countermeasure this sort of attack unless the covert channels are known. This paper is an attempt to reveal a new covert channel, not only being specific to smartphones, but also exploiting an unusual resource as a vehicle to carry covert information: sensors data. Accelerometers generate signals that reflect user motions, and malware applications can apparently only read their data. However, if the vibration motor on the device is used properly, programmatically produced vibration patterns can encode stolen data and hence an application can cause discernible effects on acceleration data to be received and decoded by another application. Our evaluations confirmed a real threat where strings of tens of characters could be transmitted errorless if the throughput is reduced to around 2.5–5 bps. The proposed covert channel is very stealthy as no unusual permissions are required and there is no explicit communication between the colluding applications.
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institution Kabale University
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language English
publishDate 2014-01-01
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series The Scientific World Journal
spelling doaj-art-8bf6d78f50e5479488425029089db44c2025-02-03T06:12:28ZengWileyThe Scientific World Journal2356-61401537-744X2014-01-01201410.1155/2014/969628969628A New Sensors-Based Covert Channel on AndroidAhmed Al-Haiqi0Mahamod Ismail1Rosdiadee Nordin2Department of Electrical, Electronic and Systems Engineering, National University of Malaysia (UKM), 43600 Bangi, MalaysiaDepartment of Electrical, Electronic and Systems Engineering, National University of Malaysia (UKM), 43600 Bangi, MalaysiaDepartment of Electrical, Electronic and Systems Engineering, National University of Malaysia (UKM), 43600 Bangi, MalaysiaCovert channels are not new in computing systems, and have been studied since their first definition four decades ago. New platforms invoke thorough investigations to assess their security. Now is the time for Android platform to analyze its security model, in particular the two key principles: process-isolation and the permissions system. Aside from all sorts of malware, one threat proved intractable by current protection solutions, that is, collusion attacks involving two applications communicating over covert channels. Still no universal solution can countermeasure this sort of attack unless the covert channels are known. This paper is an attempt to reveal a new covert channel, not only being specific to smartphones, but also exploiting an unusual resource as a vehicle to carry covert information: sensors data. Accelerometers generate signals that reflect user motions, and malware applications can apparently only read their data. However, if the vibration motor on the device is used properly, programmatically produced vibration patterns can encode stolen data and hence an application can cause discernible effects on acceleration data to be received and decoded by another application. Our evaluations confirmed a real threat where strings of tens of characters could be transmitted errorless if the throughput is reduced to around 2.5–5 bps. The proposed covert channel is very stealthy as no unusual permissions are required and there is no explicit communication between the colluding applications.http://dx.doi.org/10.1155/2014/969628
spellingShingle Ahmed Al-Haiqi
Mahamod Ismail
Rosdiadee Nordin
A New Sensors-Based Covert Channel on Android
The Scientific World Journal
title A New Sensors-Based Covert Channel on Android
title_full A New Sensors-Based Covert Channel on Android
title_fullStr A New Sensors-Based Covert Channel on Android
title_full_unstemmed A New Sensors-Based Covert Channel on Android
title_short A New Sensors-Based Covert Channel on Android
title_sort new sensors based covert channel on android
url http://dx.doi.org/10.1155/2014/969628
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