Evolutionary Game Analysis of Capital-Constrained Supplier’s and Manufacturer’s Financing Schemes
Purchase order financing (POF) and buyer direct financing (BDF) are both innovative financing schemes aiming to help financial constrained suppliers secure financing for production. In this paper, we investigate the interaction mechanism between suppliers’ financing strategy selection and manufactur...
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| Main Authors: | , , |
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| Format: | Article |
| Language: | English |
| Published: |
Wiley
2021-01-01
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| Series: | Complexity |
| Online Access: | http://dx.doi.org/10.1155/2021/8875794 |
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| Summary: | Purchase order financing (POF) and buyer direct financing (BDF) are both innovative financing schemes aiming to help financial constrained suppliers secure financing for production. In this paper, we investigate the interaction mechanism between suppliers’ financing strategy selection and manufacturers’ loans offering strategy adoption under two innovative financing schemes. We developed an evolutionary game model to effectively investigate the interaction mechanism between suppliers and manufacturers and analyzed the evolutionary stable strategies of the game model. Then we used system dynamics to present the performance of the evolutionary game model and took a sensitivity analysis to verify the theoretical results. The main conclusions are as follows: in the supply chain, to deal with the noncooperation among suppliers and manufacturers on innovative financing schemes, the revenue of manufacturers, the rate of manufacturer loan, and the proper financial risk factor should be relatively high. |
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| ISSN: | 1099-0526 |