The Secularisation of Conscience: A Natural Law Critique

The modern conception of a ‘secular conscience’ is at one time, both paradoxical and reductive. This phenomenon is attributable to two main factors. In the formal sense, the problem stems from a facile or partial invocation of the term, a result of the fragmentation of its multiple referents. In a s...

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Main Author: Constance Youngwon Lee
Format: Article
Language:English
Published: University of Southern Queensland Law, Religion, and Heritage Research Program Team 2024-04-01
Series:Australian Journal of Law & Religion
Subjects:
Online Access:https://ausjlr.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/05/Volume-4-Lee.pdf
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author Constance Youngwon Lee
author_facet Constance Youngwon Lee
author_sort Constance Youngwon Lee
collection DOAJ
description The modern conception of a ‘secular conscience’ is at one time, both paradoxical and reductive. This phenomenon is attributable to two main factors. In the formal sense, the problem stems from a facile or partial invocation of the term, a result of the fragmentation of its multiple referents. In a substantive sense, the loss of conscience’s explanatory power is a direct result of removing moral structures that underpin traditional formulations of the concept. Historically, conscience has been a necessary component of moral epistemologies. As the innate mechanism for moral discernment, conscience existed as a core part of practical reasoning. In this backdrop, one of secularism’s most profound implications has been to shift conscience’s emphasis away from notions of ‘higher responsibility’ to ‘individual authenticity’. To make sense of this shift, the present article begins by considering the process of ‘secularisation’. Harold Berman defines ‘secularisation’ as the steady displacement of existing normative foundations. The article goes on to trace the etymological development of conscience as a concept and its historical link to moral agency. An examination of traditional normative structures follows, as represented by two seminal accounts of conscience in Western natural law tradition, namely those of Thomas Aquinas and John Calvin. Notwithstanding the variations in emphases due to denominational differences, both these natural law accounts offer a coherent normative outlook, adequate to sustain an integrated concept of conscience. The article ultimately seeks to critique the explanatory potential of modern accounts of conscience by exposing the ontological predicates of secular-rational modalities from the natural law perspective.
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spelling doaj-art-86d9c93c06b14d9b9bf5438691683d1c2024-11-17T08:46:50ZengUniversity of Southern Queensland Law, Religion, and Heritage Research Program TeamAustralian Journal of Law & Religion2653-51222024-04-0145774https://doi.org/10.55803/D661BThe Secularisation of Conscience: A Natural Law CritiqueConstance Youngwon Lee0School of Justice and Society, University of South AustraliaThe modern conception of a ‘secular conscience’ is at one time, both paradoxical and reductive. This phenomenon is attributable to two main factors. In the formal sense, the problem stems from a facile or partial invocation of the term, a result of the fragmentation of its multiple referents. In a substantive sense, the loss of conscience’s explanatory power is a direct result of removing moral structures that underpin traditional formulations of the concept. Historically, conscience has been a necessary component of moral epistemologies. As the innate mechanism for moral discernment, conscience existed as a core part of practical reasoning. In this backdrop, one of secularism’s most profound implications has been to shift conscience’s emphasis away from notions of ‘higher responsibility’ to ‘individual authenticity’. To make sense of this shift, the present article begins by considering the process of ‘secularisation’. Harold Berman defines ‘secularisation’ as the steady displacement of existing normative foundations. The article goes on to trace the etymological development of conscience as a concept and its historical link to moral agency. An examination of traditional normative structures follows, as represented by two seminal accounts of conscience in Western natural law tradition, namely those of Thomas Aquinas and John Calvin. Notwithstanding the variations in emphases due to denominational differences, both these natural law accounts offer a coherent normative outlook, adequate to sustain an integrated concept of conscience. The article ultimately seeks to critique the explanatory potential of modern accounts of conscience by exposing the ontological predicates of secular-rational modalities from the natural law perspective.https://ausjlr.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/05/Volume-4-Lee.pdfnatural lawconsciencesecularisationaquinascalvin
spellingShingle Constance Youngwon Lee
The Secularisation of Conscience: A Natural Law Critique
Australian Journal of Law & Religion
natural law
conscience
secularisation
aquinas
calvin
title The Secularisation of Conscience: A Natural Law Critique
title_full The Secularisation of Conscience: A Natural Law Critique
title_fullStr The Secularisation of Conscience: A Natural Law Critique
title_full_unstemmed The Secularisation of Conscience: A Natural Law Critique
title_short The Secularisation of Conscience: A Natural Law Critique
title_sort secularisation of conscience a natural law critique
topic natural law
conscience
secularisation
aquinas
calvin
url https://ausjlr.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/05/Volume-4-Lee.pdf
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