The Dynamic Rent-Seeking Games with Policymaker Cost and Competition Intensity
In this paper, a dynamic rent-seeking game incorporating policymaker cost and competition intensity is considered. On the basis of the political environment and rent-seekers with incomplete information set, the locally asymptotic stability of Nash equilibrium is proved. The competition intensity and...
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| Format: | Article |
| Language: | English |
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Wiley
2020-01-01
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| Series: | Discrete Dynamics in Nature and Society |
| Online Access: | http://dx.doi.org/10.1155/2020/8081370 |
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| _version_ | 1832566006394912768 |
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| author | Yu Yu Jia-Qian Xu |
| author_facet | Yu Yu Jia-Qian Xu |
| author_sort | Yu Yu |
| collection | DOAJ |
| description | In this paper, a dynamic rent-seeking game incorporating policymaker cost and competition intensity is considered. On the basis of the political environment and rent-seekers with incomplete information set, the locally asymptotic stability of Nash equilibrium is proved. The competition intensity and policymaker cost could enlarge the stability region of Nash equilibrium. The higher the competition intensity is, the more the opponent’s expenditure reduces the player’s success probability, which is beneficial to the maintenance of Nash equilibrium. The higher the policymaker cost is, the less easily both players succeed and the more stable the rent-seeking market is. As the competition parameter decreases or the expenditure parameter increases, there will be chaos in a rent-seeking market. Chaos control is in order to stabilize the equilibrium of the rent-seeking game. |
| format | Article |
| id | doaj-art-8650a53e594347d7a3f49ba48363e8aa |
| institution | Kabale University |
| issn | 1026-0226 1607-887X |
| language | English |
| publishDate | 2020-01-01 |
| publisher | Wiley |
| record_format | Article |
| series | Discrete Dynamics in Nature and Society |
| spelling | doaj-art-8650a53e594347d7a3f49ba48363e8aa2025-02-03T01:05:23ZengWileyDiscrete Dynamics in Nature and Society1026-02261607-887X2020-01-01202010.1155/2020/80813708081370The Dynamic Rent-Seeking Games with Policymaker Cost and Competition IntensityYu Yu0Jia-Qian Xu1School of Economics, Zhejiang University of Finance & Economics, Hangzhou, Zhejiang 310018, ChinaSchool of Economics, Zhejiang University of Finance & Economics, Hangzhou, Zhejiang 310018, ChinaIn this paper, a dynamic rent-seeking game incorporating policymaker cost and competition intensity is considered. On the basis of the political environment and rent-seekers with incomplete information set, the locally asymptotic stability of Nash equilibrium is proved. The competition intensity and policymaker cost could enlarge the stability region of Nash equilibrium. The higher the competition intensity is, the more the opponent’s expenditure reduces the player’s success probability, which is beneficial to the maintenance of Nash equilibrium. The higher the policymaker cost is, the less easily both players succeed and the more stable the rent-seeking market is. As the competition parameter decreases or the expenditure parameter increases, there will be chaos in a rent-seeking market. Chaos control is in order to stabilize the equilibrium of the rent-seeking game.http://dx.doi.org/10.1155/2020/8081370 |
| spellingShingle | Yu Yu Jia-Qian Xu The Dynamic Rent-Seeking Games with Policymaker Cost and Competition Intensity Discrete Dynamics in Nature and Society |
| title | The Dynamic Rent-Seeking Games with Policymaker Cost and Competition Intensity |
| title_full | The Dynamic Rent-Seeking Games with Policymaker Cost and Competition Intensity |
| title_fullStr | The Dynamic Rent-Seeking Games with Policymaker Cost and Competition Intensity |
| title_full_unstemmed | The Dynamic Rent-Seeking Games with Policymaker Cost and Competition Intensity |
| title_short | The Dynamic Rent-Seeking Games with Policymaker Cost and Competition Intensity |
| title_sort | dynamic rent seeking games with policymaker cost and competition intensity |
| url | http://dx.doi.org/10.1155/2020/8081370 |
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