Kaplan and Marti on Definite Descriptions: Non-Standard Cases of Referential Use
Donnellan’s distinction between referential and attributive uses of definite descriptions has two explanations — the semantic and the pragmatic one. A version of semantic explanations was outlined by Kaplan and elaborated in detail by Marti. They construe a referentially used definite description...
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| Main Author: | |
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| Format: | Article |
| Language: | English |
| Published: |
Omsk State Technical University, Federal State Autonomous Educational Institution of Higher Education
2024-09-01
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| Series: | Омский научный вестник: Серия "Общество. История. Современность" |
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| Online Access: | https://www.omgtu.ru/general_information/media_omgtu/journal_of_omsk_research_journal/files/arhiv/2024/%D0%A2.9,%20%E2%84%96%203%20(%D0%9E%D0%98%D0%A1)/79-82%20%D0%91%D0%BE%D1%80%D0%B8%D1%81%D0%BE%D0%B2%20%D0%95.%20%D0%92..pdf |
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| Summary: | Donnellan’s distinction between referential and attributive uses of definite
descriptions has two explanations — the semantic and the pragmatic one. A version
of semantic explanations was outlined by Kaplan and elaborated in detail by Marti.
They construe a referentially used definite description as a proper name in the
Millian sense. In a recent paper, I showed that the evidence Kaplan–Marti theory
relies on is inappropriate with respect to the standard case of referential use,
which makes the pragmatic theory preferable. This paper is a continuation of the
cited one. Here I examine a number of non-standard cases of referential use and
demonstrate that, with respect to them, Kaplan–Marti theory has no advantage
over the pragmatic account either. |
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| ISSN: | 2542-0488 2541-7983 |