The Incentive Model in Supply Chain with Trade Credit and Default Risk
Trade credit is widely used for its advantages. However, trade credit also brings default risk to the manufacturer due to the uncertain demand. And moral hazard may aggravate the default risk. The purpose of this paper is to investigate the role of moral hazard in trade credit and explore incentive...
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Main Authors: | Hong Cheng, Yingsheng Su, Jinjiang Yan, Xianyu Wang, Mingyang Li |
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Format: | Article |
Language: | English |
Published: |
Wiley
2019-01-01
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Series: | Complexity |
Online Access: | http://dx.doi.org/10.1155/2019/5909785 |
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