Leibniz on Slavery and the Ownership of Human Beings

Leibniz puts forward an intriguing argument against the moral permissibility of chattel slavery in a text from 1703. This argument has three independent layers or sub-arguments. The first is that slavery violates natural rights. The second is that moral laws such as the principles of equity and piet...

Full description

Saved in:
Bibliographic Details
Main Author: Julia Jorati
Format: Article
Language:English
Published: Aperio 2019-12-01
Series:Journal of Modern Philosophy
Subjects:
Online Access:https://jmphil.org/article/id/2132/
Tags: Add Tag
No Tags, Be the first to tag this record!
_version_ 1832575960900173824
author Julia Jorati
author_facet Julia Jorati
author_sort Julia Jorati
collection DOAJ
description Leibniz puts forward an intriguing argument against the moral permissibility of chattel slavery in a text from 1703. This argument has three independent layers or sub-arguments. The first is that slavery violates natural rights. The second is that moral laws such as the principles of equity and piety oppose slavery, or at least severely limit the permissible actions toward slaves. The third and final layer is that slavery can at most be justified if the slave is permanently incapable of conducting herself well. Yet, it is very doubtful that any actual human beings satisfy that description. This paper analyzes and evaluates Leibniz’s argument, which scholars have so far largely neglected. Even though some elements of the argument are not original to Leibniz, it is of considerable importance for the scholarship of early modern philosophy: it sheds light on Leibniz’s views not only on the moral status of slavery itself, but also on moral rights and obligations more generally.
format Article
id doaj-art-7bc6d08fa2ef4d73bdb834c6eeec98ac
institution Kabale University
issn 2644-0652
language English
publishDate 2019-12-01
publisher Aperio
record_format Article
series Journal of Modern Philosophy
spelling doaj-art-7bc6d08fa2ef4d73bdb834c6eeec98ac2025-01-31T16:07:56ZengAperioJournal of Modern Philosophy2644-06522019-12-011010.25894/jmp.2132Leibniz on Slavery and the Ownership of Human BeingsJulia Jorati0https://orcid.org/0000-0002-6110-0959Philosophy, University of Massachusetts AmherstLeibniz puts forward an intriguing argument against the moral permissibility of chattel slavery in a text from 1703. This argument has three independent layers or sub-arguments. The first is that slavery violates natural rights. The second is that moral laws such as the principles of equity and piety oppose slavery, or at least severely limit the permissible actions toward slaves. The third and final layer is that slavery can at most be justified if the slave is permanently incapable of conducting herself well. Yet, it is very doubtful that any actual human beings satisfy that description. This paper analyzes and evaluates Leibniz’s argument, which scholars have so far largely neglected. Even though some elements of the argument are not original to Leibniz, it is of considerable importance for the scholarship of early modern philosophy: it sheds light on Leibniz’s views not only on the moral status of slavery itself, but also on moral rights and obligations more generally.https://jmphil.org/article/id/2132/Leibnizslaverychildrenrightspropertyjustice
spellingShingle Julia Jorati
Leibniz on Slavery and the Ownership of Human Beings
Journal of Modern Philosophy
Leibniz
slavery
children
rights
property
justice
title Leibniz on Slavery and the Ownership of Human Beings
title_full Leibniz on Slavery and the Ownership of Human Beings
title_fullStr Leibniz on Slavery and the Ownership of Human Beings
title_full_unstemmed Leibniz on Slavery and the Ownership of Human Beings
title_short Leibniz on Slavery and the Ownership of Human Beings
title_sort leibniz on slavery and the ownership of human beings
topic Leibniz
slavery
children
rights
property
justice
url https://jmphil.org/article/id/2132/
work_keys_str_mv AT juliajorati leibnizonslaveryandtheownershipofhumanbeings