Exploiting Small Leakages in Masks to Turn a Second-Order Attack into a First-Order Attack and Improved Rotating Substitution Box Masking with Linear Code Cosets

Masking countermeasures, used to thwart side-channel attacks, have been shown to be vulnerable to mask-extraction attacks. State-of-the-art mask-extraction attacks on the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) algorithm target S-Box recomputation schemes but have not been applied to scenarios where S-Bo...

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Main Authors: Alexander DeTrano, Naghmeh Karimi, Ramesh Karri, Xiaofei Guo, Claude Carlet, Sylvain Guilley
Format: Article
Language:English
Published: Wiley 2015-01-01
Series:The Scientific World Journal
Online Access:http://dx.doi.org/10.1155/2015/743618
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author Alexander DeTrano
Naghmeh Karimi
Ramesh Karri
Xiaofei Guo
Claude Carlet
Sylvain Guilley
author_facet Alexander DeTrano
Naghmeh Karimi
Ramesh Karri
Xiaofei Guo
Claude Carlet
Sylvain Guilley
author_sort Alexander DeTrano
collection DOAJ
description Masking countermeasures, used to thwart side-channel attacks, have been shown to be vulnerable to mask-extraction attacks. State-of-the-art mask-extraction attacks on the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) algorithm target S-Box recomputation schemes but have not been applied to scenarios where S-Boxes are precomputed offline. We propose an attack targeting precomputed S-Boxes stored in nonvolatile memory. Our attack targets AES implemented in software protected by a low entropy masking scheme and recovers the masks with 91% success rate. Recovering the secret key requires fewer power traces (in fact, by at least two orders of magnitude) compared to a classical second-order attack. Moreover, we show that this attack remains viable in a noisy environment or with a reduced number of leakage points. Eventually, we specify a method to enhance the countermeasure by selecting a suitable coset of the masks set.
format Article
id doaj-art-79b59cda8a2b44f9bfd9fed100246d15
institution Kabale University
issn 2356-6140
1537-744X
language English
publishDate 2015-01-01
publisher Wiley
record_format Article
series The Scientific World Journal
spelling doaj-art-79b59cda8a2b44f9bfd9fed100246d152025-02-03T05:52:07ZengWileyThe Scientific World Journal2356-61401537-744X2015-01-01201510.1155/2015/743618743618Exploiting Small Leakages in Masks to Turn a Second-Order Attack into a First-Order Attack and Improved Rotating Substitution Box Masking with Linear Code CosetsAlexander DeTrano0Naghmeh Karimi1Ramesh Karri2Xiaofei Guo3Claude Carlet4Sylvain Guilley5New York University, New York, NY 10012, USARutgers University, New Brunswick, NJ 08901, USANew York University, New York, NY 10012, USASecurity Center of Excellence, Intel Corporation, Hillsboro, OR 97124, USAParis 8 University, 93526 Saint-Denis, FranceTélécom ParisTech, 75634 Paris, FranceMasking countermeasures, used to thwart side-channel attacks, have been shown to be vulnerable to mask-extraction attacks. State-of-the-art mask-extraction attacks on the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) algorithm target S-Box recomputation schemes but have not been applied to scenarios where S-Boxes are precomputed offline. We propose an attack targeting precomputed S-Boxes stored in nonvolatile memory. Our attack targets AES implemented in software protected by a low entropy masking scheme and recovers the masks with 91% success rate. Recovering the secret key requires fewer power traces (in fact, by at least two orders of magnitude) compared to a classical second-order attack. Moreover, we show that this attack remains viable in a noisy environment or with a reduced number of leakage points. Eventually, we specify a method to enhance the countermeasure by selecting a suitable coset of the masks set.http://dx.doi.org/10.1155/2015/743618
spellingShingle Alexander DeTrano
Naghmeh Karimi
Ramesh Karri
Xiaofei Guo
Claude Carlet
Sylvain Guilley
Exploiting Small Leakages in Masks to Turn a Second-Order Attack into a First-Order Attack and Improved Rotating Substitution Box Masking with Linear Code Cosets
The Scientific World Journal
title Exploiting Small Leakages in Masks to Turn a Second-Order Attack into a First-Order Attack and Improved Rotating Substitution Box Masking with Linear Code Cosets
title_full Exploiting Small Leakages in Masks to Turn a Second-Order Attack into a First-Order Attack and Improved Rotating Substitution Box Masking with Linear Code Cosets
title_fullStr Exploiting Small Leakages in Masks to Turn a Second-Order Attack into a First-Order Attack and Improved Rotating Substitution Box Masking with Linear Code Cosets
title_full_unstemmed Exploiting Small Leakages in Masks to Turn a Second-Order Attack into a First-Order Attack and Improved Rotating Substitution Box Masking with Linear Code Cosets
title_short Exploiting Small Leakages in Masks to Turn a Second-Order Attack into a First-Order Attack and Improved Rotating Substitution Box Masking with Linear Code Cosets
title_sort exploiting small leakages in masks to turn a second order attack into a first order attack and improved rotating substitution box masking with linear code cosets
url http://dx.doi.org/10.1155/2015/743618
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