Modal Metaphysics and the Priority of Causes in Hume's Treatise
In his Treatise of Human Nature Hume claims to demonstrate that simultaneous causation is absolutely impossible; all causes must precede their effects in time. I argue that considering Hume’s modal theory can reveal two important and previously unaddressed features of this argument. First, Hume’s mo...
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| Format: | Article |
| Language: | English |
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Aperio
2024-09-01
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| Series: | Journal of Modern Philosophy |
| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | https://jmphil.org/article/id/2393/ |
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| Summary: | In his Treatise of Human Nature Hume claims to demonstrate that simultaneous causation is absolutely impossible; all causes must precede their effects in time. I argue that considering Hume’s modal theory can reveal two important and previously unaddressed features of this argument. First, Hume’s modal metaphysics explains how he is able to infer from the claim that it is possible for some object to be simultaneously caused to the claim that it is possible for all objects to be simultaneously caused. This inference, I argue, is justified by Hume’s combinatorial modal theory for relations. Second, his distinction between absolute and natural modality raises a problem that has not yet been identified in the literature. Hume’s conclusion is that simultaneous causation is metaphysically impossible, but one of his premises relies on a mere natural impossibility (that every beginning of existence requires a cause). This is an intractable problem: Hume cannot get the conclusion he wants because it depends on an equivocation between two strengths of modality. |
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| ISSN: | 2644-0652 |