Semantics of legal concepts and natural kind terms: D. Patterson’s arguments
The paper is devoted to the analysis of the arguments of the american legal philosopher Dennis Patterson regarding the applicability of the natural kinds terms to the semantics of the legal language. Based on the Ronald Dworkin’s theory of law, reasonable criticized by D. Patterson, the features...
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Format: | Article |
Language: | English |
Published: |
Omsk State Technical University, Federal State Autonomous Educational Institution of Higher Education
2021-05-01
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Series: | Омский научный вестник: Серия "Общество. История. Современность" |
Subjects: | |
Online Access: | https://www.omgtu.ru/general_information/media_omgtu/journal_of_omsk_research_journal/files/arhiv/2021/%D0%A2.%206,%20%E2%84%96%202%20(%D0%9E%D0%98%D0%A1)/94-98%20%D0%94%D0%B8%D0%B4%D0%B8%D0%BA%D0%B8%D0%BD%20%D0%90.%20%D0%91..pdf |
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Summary: | The paper is devoted to the analysis of the arguments of the american legal
philosopher Dennis Patterson regarding the applicability of the natural kinds terms
to the semantics of the legal language. Based on the Ronald Dworkin’s theory
of law, reasonable criticized by D. Patterson, the features of the formation and
interpretation of legal concepts are considered. Arguments are presented that
demonstrate the content of R. Dworkin and D. Patterson’s methodological approach
to the interpretation of the semantics of legal concepts as well as argumentation
regarding the normativity of legal reality, the objects of which are displayed in the
content of legal concepts |
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ISSN: | 2542-0488 2541-7983 |