Do losses trigger deliberative reasoning?
There is a large literature evaluating the dual process model of cognition, including the biases and heuristics it implies. However, our understanding of what causes effortful thinking remains incomplete. To advance this literature, we focus on what triggers decision-makers to switch from the intuit...
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Cambridge University Press
2025-01-01
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| Series: | Judgment and Decision Making |
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| Online Access: | https://www.cambridge.org/core/product/identifier/S1930297524000196/type/journal_article |
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| author | Jeffrey Carpenter David Munro |
| author_facet | Jeffrey Carpenter David Munro |
| author_sort | Jeffrey Carpenter |
| collection | DOAJ |
| description | There is a large literature evaluating the dual process model of cognition, including the biases and heuristics it implies. However, our understanding of what causes effortful thinking remains incomplete. To advance this literature, we focus on what triggers decision-makers to switch from the intuitive process (System 1) to the more deliberative process (System 2). We examine how the framing of incentives (gains versus losses) influences decision processing. To evaluate this, we design experiments based on a task developed to distinguish between intuitive and deliberative thinking. Replicating previous research, we find that losses elicit more cognitive effort. Most importantly, we also find that losses differentially reduce the incidence of intuitive answers, consistent with triggering a shift between these modes of cognition. We find substantial heterogeneity in these effects, with young men being much more responsive to the loss framing. To complement these findings, we provide robustness tests of our results using aggregated data, the imposition of a constraint to hinder the activation of System 2, and an analysis of incorrect, but unintuitive, answers to inform hybrid models of choice. |
| format | Article |
| id | doaj-art-6e43e306549a4bcd91c20cc9b0f5bf53 |
| institution | Kabale University |
| issn | 1930-2975 |
| language | English |
| publishDate | 2025-01-01 |
| publisher | Cambridge University Press |
| record_format | Article |
| series | Judgment and Decision Making |
| spelling | doaj-art-6e43e306549a4bcd91c20cc9b0f5bf532025-01-23T07:05:14ZengCambridge University PressJudgment and Decision Making1930-29752025-01-012010.1017/jdm.2024.19Do losses trigger deliberative reasoning?Jeffrey Carpenter0David Munro1https://orcid.org/0000-0002-6170-1746IZA and Department of Economics Middlebury College, Middlebury, VT, USADepartment of Economics, Middlebury College, Middlebury, VT, USAThere is a large literature evaluating the dual process model of cognition, including the biases and heuristics it implies. However, our understanding of what causes effortful thinking remains incomplete. To advance this literature, we focus on what triggers decision-makers to switch from the intuitive process (System 1) to the more deliberative process (System 2). We examine how the framing of incentives (gains versus losses) influences decision processing. To evaluate this, we design experiments based on a task developed to distinguish between intuitive and deliberative thinking. Replicating previous research, we find that losses elicit more cognitive effort. Most importantly, we also find that losses differentially reduce the incidence of intuitive answers, consistent with triggering a shift between these modes of cognition. We find substantial heterogeneity in these effects, with young men being much more responsive to the loss framing. To complement these findings, we provide robustness tests of our results using aggregated data, the imposition of a constraint to hinder the activation of System 2, and an analysis of incorrect, but unintuitive, answers to inform hybrid models of choice.https://www.cambridge.org/core/product/identifier/S1930297524000196/type/journal_articledual process theorycognitive effortbiasincentiveslossexperiment |
| spellingShingle | Jeffrey Carpenter David Munro Do losses trigger deliberative reasoning? Judgment and Decision Making dual process theory cognitive effort bias incentives loss experiment |
| title | Do losses trigger deliberative reasoning? |
| title_full | Do losses trigger deliberative reasoning? |
| title_fullStr | Do losses trigger deliberative reasoning? |
| title_full_unstemmed | Do losses trigger deliberative reasoning? |
| title_short | Do losses trigger deliberative reasoning? |
| title_sort | do losses trigger deliberative reasoning |
| topic | dual process theory cognitive effort bias incentives loss experiment |
| url | https://www.cambridge.org/core/product/identifier/S1930297524000196/type/journal_article |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT jeffreycarpenter dolossestriggerdeliberativereasoning AT davidmunro dolossestriggerdeliberativereasoning |