The moral problem is a Hume problem
The moral problem, as articulated by Smith, arises out of the attempt to introduce the experimental method of reasoning into moral subjects, developed by Hume. This paper returns to Locke's earlier attempt to provide an empirically adequate account of morality and the debate his attempt generat...
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University of Belgrade - Faculty of Philosophy - Institute for Philosophy
2024-01-01
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| Series: | Belgrade Philosophical Annual |
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| Online Access: | https://scindeks-clanci.ceon.rs/data/pdf/0353-3891/2024/0353-38912401103G.pdf |
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| description | The moral problem, as articulated by Smith, arises out of the attempt to introduce the experimental method of reasoning into moral subjects, developed by Hume. This paper returns to Locke's earlier attempt to provide an empirically adequate account of morality and the debate his attempt generated. It argues that the seeds of a more adequate, naturalistic account of the metaphysics and epistemology of morals than that developed by either Locke or Hume can already be found in aspects of Locke's Essay and in the defence of his views published by Catharine Trotter Cockburn. Locke and Cockburn find a natural, intrinsically moral, human disposition in our tendency to judge the moral good or evil of persons or actions in the light of their conformity with a moral law. It is constitutive of our nature as social beings that we are endowed 'with a moral sense or conscience, that approves of virtuous actions, and disapproves the contrary. ' Moral laws are those prohibitions and obligations that benefit others and society as a whole. Thus, the question of natural, moral motivation is seen to be independent of the question of the objective grounds of moral truth. In virtue of our nature as social beings we are motivated to do what is approved of by other members of our society. Whether what is approved of by a society genuinely fosters the welfare of its members is an independent, a posteriori question that can only be answered through reasoned, empirically informed debate. |
| format | Article |
| id | doaj-art-6c13929c44084d5e9afaf5fdc33ec1f5 |
| institution | Kabale University |
| issn | 0353-3891 2956-0357 |
| language | English |
| publishDate | 2024-01-01 |
| publisher | University of Belgrade - Faculty of Philosophy - Institute for Philosophy |
| record_format | Article |
| series | Belgrade Philosophical Annual |
| spelling | doaj-art-6c13929c44084d5e9afaf5fdc33ec1f52025-02-05T12:20:31ZengUniversity of Belgrade - Faculty of Philosophy - Institute for PhilosophyBelgrade Philosophical Annual0353-38912956-03572024-01-0137110311910.5937/BPA2437103G0353-38912401103GThe moral problem is a Hume problemGreen Karen0The University of MelbourneThe moral problem, as articulated by Smith, arises out of the attempt to introduce the experimental method of reasoning into moral subjects, developed by Hume. This paper returns to Locke's earlier attempt to provide an empirically adequate account of morality and the debate his attempt generated. It argues that the seeds of a more adequate, naturalistic account of the metaphysics and epistemology of morals than that developed by either Locke or Hume can already be found in aspects of Locke's Essay and in the defence of his views published by Catharine Trotter Cockburn. Locke and Cockburn find a natural, intrinsically moral, human disposition in our tendency to judge the moral good or evil of persons or actions in the light of their conformity with a moral law. It is constitutive of our nature as social beings that we are endowed 'with a moral sense or conscience, that approves of virtuous actions, and disapproves the contrary. ' Moral laws are those prohibitions and obligations that benefit others and society as a whole. Thus, the question of natural, moral motivation is seen to be independent of the question of the objective grounds of moral truth. In virtue of our nature as social beings we are motivated to do what is approved of by other members of our society. Whether what is approved of by a society genuinely fosters the welfare of its members is an independent, a posteriori question that can only be answered through reasoned, empirically informed debate.https://scindeks-clanci.ceon.rs/data/pdf/0353-3891/2024/0353-38912401103G.pdfconsciencecognitivismnaturalismnatural lawcounterfactuals |
| spellingShingle | Green Karen The moral problem is a Hume problem Belgrade Philosophical Annual conscience cognitivism naturalism natural law counterfactuals |
| title | The moral problem is a Hume problem |
| title_full | The moral problem is a Hume problem |
| title_fullStr | The moral problem is a Hume problem |
| title_full_unstemmed | The moral problem is a Hume problem |
| title_short | The moral problem is a Hume problem |
| title_sort | moral problem is a hume problem |
| topic | conscience cognitivism naturalism natural law counterfactuals |
| url | https://scindeks-clanci.ceon.rs/data/pdf/0353-3891/2024/0353-38912401103G.pdf |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT greenkaren themoralproblemisahumeproblem AT greenkaren moralproblemisahumeproblem |