The Contours of Locke’s General Substance Dualism
In this paper, I will argue that Locke is a substance dualist in the general sense, in that he holds that there are, independent of our classificatory schema, two distinct kinds of substances: wholly material ones and wholly immaterial ones. On Locke’s view, the difference between the two lies in wh...
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2022-03-01
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| Series: | Journal of Modern Philosophy |
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| Online Access: | https://jmphil.org/article/id/1986/ |
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| author | Graham Clay |
| author_facet | Graham Clay |
| author_sort | Graham Clay |
| collection | DOAJ |
| description | In this paper, I will argue that Locke is a substance dualist in the general sense, in that he holds that there are, independent of our classificatory schema, two distinct kinds of substances: wholly material ones and wholly immaterial ones. On Locke’s view, the difference between the two lies in whether they are solid or not, thereby differentiating him from Descartes. My way of establishing Locke as a general substance dualist is to be as minimally committal as possible at the outset, especially with respect to the classic debates on Locke’s positions in this domain, including those concerning substrata, real essences, and the like. Nonetheless, I show that minimal commitments about Locke’s primary/secondary quality distinction are sufficient to derive some substantive conclusions about his positions on these issues, as well as that he is a general substance dualist. |
| format | Article |
| id | doaj-art-698fa02f6e8c4800a57d8c836b2d44ef |
| institution | Kabale University |
| issn | 2644-0652 |
| language | English |
| publishDate | 2022-03-01 |
| publisher | Aperio |
| record_format | Article |
| series | Journal of Modern Philosophy |
| spelling | doaj-art-698fa02f6e8c4800a57d8c836b2d44ef2025-01-31T16:08:27ZengAperioJournal of Modern Philosophy2644-06522022-03-014010.25894/jmp.1986The Contours of Locke’s General Substance DualismGraham Clay0 In this paper, I will argue that Locke is a substance dualist in the general sense, in that he holds that there are, independent of our classificatory schema, two distinct kinds of substances: wholly material ones and wholly immaterial ones. On Locke’s view, the difference between the two lies in whether they are solid or not, thereby differentiating him from Descartes. My way of establishing Locke as a general substance dualist is to be as minimally committal as possible at the outset, especially with respect to the classic debates on Locke’s positions in this domain, including those concerning substrata, real essences, and the like. Nonetheless, I show that minimal commitments about Locke’s primary/secondary quality distinction are sufficient to derive some substantive conclusions about his positions on these issues, as well as that he is a general substance dualist.https://jmphil.org/article/id/1986/lockesubstance dualismreal essencesubstratumrelative idea |
| spellingShingle | Graham Clay The Contours of Locke’s General Substance Dualism Journal of Modern Philosophy locke substance dualism real essence substratum relative idea |
| title | The Contours of Locke’s General Substance Dualism |
| title_full | The Contours of Locke’s General Substance Dualism |
| title_fullStr | The Contours of Locke’s General Substance Dualism |
| title_full_unstemmed | The Contours of Locke’s General Substance Dualism |
| title_short | The Contours of Locke’s General Substance Dualism |
| title_sort | contours of locke s general substance dualism |
| topic | locke substance dualism real essence substratum relative idea |
| url | https://jmphil.org/article/id/1986/ |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT grahamclay thecontoursoflockesgeneralsubstancedualism AT grahamclay contoursoflockesgeneralsubstancedualism |