Foreign Policy Preferences of Kazakhstan after 2022
The January 2022 protests in Kazakhstan drew global attention to the country's foreign policy orientations. This research investigates the focal states and international organizations prioritized by Kazakhstan during Kassym-Jomart Tokayev's presidency, spanning from March 20, 2019, when To...
Saved in:
| Main Authors: | , , , , , |
|---|---|
| Format: | Article |
| Language: | English |
| Published: |
MGIMO University Press
2023-09-01
|
| Series: | Vestnik MGIMO-Universiteta |
| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | https://www.vestnik.mgimo.ru/jour/article/view/3482 |
| Tags: |
Add Tag
No Tags, Be the first to tag this record!
|
| _version_ | 1832579334329597952 |
|---|---|
| author | M. Y. Kucherov I. V. Vokhmintsev I. D. Kravchuk V. Y. Andriukhin M. A. Fedotov A. A. Tokarev |
| author_facet | M. Y. Kucherov I. V. Vokhmintsev I. D. Kravchuk V. Y. Andriukhin M. A. Fedotov A. A. Tokarev |
| author_sort | M. Y. Kucherov |
| collection | DOAJ |
| description | The January 2022 protests in Kazakhstan drew global attention to the country's foreign policy orientations. This research investigates the focal states and international organizations prioritized by Kazakhstan during Kassym-Jomart Tokayev's presidency, spanning from March 20, 2019, when Tokayev assumed office, to December 31, 2022, marking the end of data collection. Employing content analysis and discourse analysis as primary methods, this study examines data from diverse sources, including the official website of Kazakhstan's President, his social media profiles, and relevant media outlets. The analysis encompasses mentions of countries, their leaders, and international organizations across three languages: Russian, Kazakh, and English.Key findings include Tokayev's frequent references to Russia (223 mentions) and China (95 mentions), while the United Nations (UN) and the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) receive the highest number of mentions among international organizations (178 and 102, respectively). Remarkably, Tokayev predominantly communicates in Russian when addressing foreign policy matters.In general, public discourse aligns closely with Kazakhstan's doctrinal discourse. However, notable discrepancies arise. Despite the Foreign Policy Concept's indication of Kazakhstan's intent to strengthen its strategic partnership with the United States, Tokayev's limited mentions of the United States (33 in total) suggest a distinct trend. |
| format | Article |
| id | doaj-art-67b740fb28c149bb8aea5a67f7293880 |
| institution | Kabale University |
| issn | 2071-8160 2541-9099 |
| language | English |
| publishDate | 2023-09-01 |
| publisher | MGIMO University Press |
| record_format | Article |
| series | Vestnik MGIMO-Universiteta |
| spelling | doaj-art-67b740fb28c149bb8aea5a67f72938802025-01-30T12:16:17ZengMGIMO University PressVestnik MGIMO-Universiteta2071-81602541-90992023-09-01164729010.24833/2071-8160-2023-4-91-72-902555Foreign Policy Preferences of Kazakhstan after 2022M. Y. Kucherov0I. V. Vokhmintsev1I. D. Kravchuk2V. Y. Andriukhin3M. A. Fedotov4A. A. Tokarev5MGIMO-UniversitySamara National Research UniversityFinancial University under the Government of the Russian FederationLomonosov Moscow State UniversityLomonosov Moscow State UniversityMGIMO-UniversityThe January 2022 protests in Kazakhstan drew global attention to the country's foreign policy orientations. This research investigates the focal states and international organizations prioritized by Kazakhstan during Kassym-Jomart Tokayev's presidency, spanning from March 20, 2019, when Tokayev assumed office, to December 31, 2022, marking the end of data collection. Employing content analysis and discourse analysis as primary methods, this study examines data from diverse sources, including the official website of Kazakhstan's President, his social media profiles, and relevant media outlets. The analysis encompasses mentions of countries, their leaders, and international organizations across three languages: Russian, Kazakh, and English.Key findings include Tokayev's frequent references to Russia (223 mentions) and China (95 mentions), while the United Nations (UN) and the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) receive the highest number of mentions among international organizations (178 and 102, respectively). Remarkably, Tokayev predominantly communicates in Russian when addressing foreign policy matters.In general, public discourse aligns closely with Kazakhstan's doctrinal discourse. However, notable discrepancies arise. Despite the Foreign Policy Concept's indication of Kazakhstan's intent to strengthen its strategic partnership with the United States, Tokayev's limited mentions of the United States (33 in total) suggest a distinct trend.https://www.vestnik.mgimo.ru/jour/article/view/3482foreign policy orientationpost-soviet spacekazakhstantokayevrussiacstoeaeucontent analysisdiscourse analysisprotests |
| spellingShingle | M. Y. Kucherov I. V. Vokhmintsev I. D. Kravchuk V. Y. Andriukhin M. A. Fedotov A. A. Tokarev Foreign Policy Preferences of Kazakhstan after 2022 Vestnik MGIMO-Universiteta foreign policy orientation post-soviet space kazakhstan tokayev russia csto eaeu content analysis discourse analysis protests |
| title | Foreign Policy Preferences of Kazakhstan after 2022 |
| title_full | Foreign Policy Preferences of Kazakhstan after 2022 |
| title_fullStr | Foreign Policy Preferences of Kazakhstan after 2022 |
| title_full_unstemmed | Foreign Policy Preferences of Kazakhstan after 2022 |
| title_short | Foreign Policy Preferences of Kazakhstan after 2022 |
| title_sort | foreign policy preferences of kazakhstan after 2022 |
| topic | foreign policy orientation post-soviet space kazakhstan tokayev russia csto eaeu content analysis discourse analysis protests |
| url | https://www.vestnik.mgimo.ru/jour/article/view/3482 |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT mykucherov foreignpolicypreferencesofkazakhstanafter2022 AT ivvokhmintsev foreignpolicypreferencesofkazakhstanafter2022 AT idkravchuk foreignpolicypreferencesofkazakhstanafter2022 AT vyandriukhin foreignpolicypreferencesofkazakhstanafter2022 AT mafedotov foreignpolicypreferencesofkazakhstanafter2022 AT aatokarev foreignpolicypreferencesofkazakhstanafter2022 |