Are pure mental states conceivable?
The article gives critical objections to the minimal dualism argument proposed by Bogdan Faul. It is demonstrated that the method of introspection used by B. Faul in his article in order to explain subject’s access to their own mental states undermines the validity of the proposed argument
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Main Author: | D. N. Razeev |
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Format: | Article |
Language: | English |
Published: |
Omsk State Technical University, Federal State Autonomous Educational Institution of Higher Education
2021-02-01
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Series: | Омский научный вестник: Серия "Общество. История. Современность" |
Subjects: | |
Online Access: | https://www.omgtu.ru/general_information/media_omgtu/journal_of_omsk_research_journal/files/arhiv/2021/%D0%A2.%206,%20%E2%84%96%201%20(%D0%9E%D0%98%D0%A1)/95-97%20%D0%A0%D0%B0%D0%B7%D0%B5%D0%B5%D0%B2%20%D0%94.%20%D0%9D..pdf |
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