A New Credit and Loan Lending Strategy and Credit in Banking Systems: An Evolutionary Game Theory Approach
In this paper, authors offer one novel mathematical model of credit lending to customers based on evolutionary game theory, and the model presents an efficient and realistic approach. The purpose of the article is to examine the evolutionary game between banks and customers for granting facilities a...
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| Format: | Article |
| Language: | English |
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Wiley
2022-01-01
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| Series: | Journal of Applied Mathematics |
| Online Access: | http://dx.doi.org/10.1155/2022/3400319 |
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| _version_ | 1832552711052066816 |
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| author | Zohreh Lashgari Alireza Bahiraie Madjid Eshaghi Gordji |
| author_facet | Zohreh Lashgari Alireza Bahiraie Madjid Eshaghi Gordji |
| author_sort | Zohreh Lashgari |
| collection | DOAJ |
| description | In this paper, authors offer one novel mathematical model of credit lending to customers based on evolutionary game theory, and the model presents an efficient and realistic approach. The purpose of the article is to examine the evolutionary game between banks and customers for granting facilities and credit. Authors assumed that customers are divided into two types. The first type of customers includes individuals or small and medium enterprises (SME), applying for microloans from the bank. The second type of customers includes corporate banking or large enterprises, applying for large loans from the bank. The relationship between the bank and the customers is a double-sided problem. Banks and customers may trust each other or want to behave opportunistically. The results show that the game has two equilibriums, and the optimal equilibrium, which is the best-case scenario, occurs when customers and bank players tending to keep “honest” and to “credit,” respectively. Authors used the evolutionary stable strategy to express the parameters that affect these interactions, and by adjusting some of these parameters, authors move the equilibrium towards the optimal solution of the game. Also, by adjusting these parameters, banks can gain more profitability. |
| format | Article |
| id | doaj-art-64d2220e03004ebbbae628188bc32cac |
| institution | Kabale University |
| issn | 1687-0042 |
| language | English |
| publishDate | 2022-01-01 |
| publisher | Wiley |
| record_format | Article |
| series | Journal of Applied Mathematics |
| spelling | doaj-art-64d2220e03004ebbbae628188bc32cac2025-02-03T05:57:59ZengWileyJournal of Applied Mathematics1687-00422022-01-01202210.1155/2022/3400319A New Credit and Loan Lending Strategy and Credit in Banking Systems: An Evolutionary Game Theory ApproachZohreh Lashgari0Alireza Bahiraie1Madjid Eshaghi Gordji2Department of MathematicsDepartment of MathematicsDepartment of MathematicsIn this paper, authors offer one novel mathematical model of credit lending to customers based on evolutionary game theory, and the model presents an efficient and realistic approach. The purpose of the article is to examine the evolutionary game between banks and customers for granting facilities and credit. Authors assumed that customers are divided into two types. The first type of customers includes individuals or small and medium enterprises (SME), applying for microloans from the bank. The second type of customers includes corporate banking or large enterprises, applying for large loans from the bank. The relationship between the bank and the customers is a double-sided problem. Banks and customers may trust each other or want to behave opportunistically. The results show that the game has two equilibriums, and the optimal equilibrium, which is the best-case scenario, occurs when customers and bank players tending to keep “honest” and to “credit,” respectively. Authors used the evolutionary stable strategy to express the parameters that affect these interactions, and by adjusting some of these parameters, authors move the equilibrium towards the optimal solution of the game. Also, by adjusting these parameters, banks can gain more profitability.http://dx.doi.org/10.1155/2022/3400319 |
| spellingShingle | Zohreh Lashgari Alireza Bahiraie Madjid Eshaghi Gordji A New Credit and Loan Lending Strategy and Credit in Banking Systems: An Evolutionary Game Theory Approach Journal of Applied Mathematics |
| title | A New Credit and Loan Lending Strategy and Credit in Banking Systems: An Evolutionary Game Theory Approach |
| title_full | A New Credit and Loan Lending Strategy and Credit in Banking Systems: An Evolutionary Game Theory Approach |
| title_fullStr | A New Credit and Loan Lending Strategy and Credit in Banking Systems: An Evolutionary Game Theory Approach |
| title_full_unstemmed | A New Credit and Loan Lending Strategy and Credit in Banking Systems: An Evolutionary Game Theory Approach |
| title_short | A New Credit and Loan Lending Strategy and Credit in Banking Systems: An Evolutionary Game Theory Approach |
| title_sort | new credit and loan lending strategy and credit in banking systems an evolutionary game theory approach |
| url | http://dx.doi.org/10.1155/2022/3400319 |
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