Contrôle et manipulation au cœur de la firme-monde ?
The aim of this contribution is to question the nature of the power relationships that characterize the governance regime of big modern firms, here called “world-firms”. The originality of this paper is double. On one hand, after having defined what a world-firm is it aims at combining in a same ana...
Saved in:
| Main Author: | |
|---|---|
| Format: | Article |
| Language: | English |
| Published: |
Association Recherche & Régulation
2013-12-01
|
| Series: | Revue de la Régulation |
| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | https://journals.openedition.org/regulation/10334 |
| Tags: |
Add Tag
No Tags, Be the first to tag this record!
|
| _version_ | 1832577893084954624 |
|---|---|
| author | Virgile Chassagnon |
| author_facet | Virgile Chassagnon |
| author_sort | Virgile Chassagnon |
| collection | DOAJ |
| description | The aim of this contribution is to question the nature of the power relationships that characterize the governance regime of big modern firms, here called “world-firms”. The originality of this paper is double. On one hand, after having defined what a world-firm is it aims at combining in a same analysis a reflection on the internal governance (employment relationship) and a reflection on the external governance of the world-firms (international subcontracting relationships) by using a particular lens : power. On other hand, it proposes to develop a new concept, namely the one of “controlation” (which is the neologism of control and manipulation), to portray the complexity and subtlety of the governance regimes of these firms that are based on both a fragmentation and a subversion of the regulating boundaries of the industrial capitalism. |
| format | Article |
| id | doaj-art-62c2659635ad4dd9a20569eb32c91517 |
| institution | Kabale University |
| issn | 1957-7796 |
| language | English |
| publishDate | 2013-12-01 |
| publisher | Association Recherche & Régulation |
| record_format | Article |
| series | Revue de la Régulation |
| spelling | doaj-art-62c2659635ad4dd9a20569eb32c915172025-01-30T14:27:25ZengAssociation Recherche & RégulationRevue de la Régulation1957-77962013-12-011410.4000/regulation.10334Contrôle et manipulation au cœur de la firme-monde ?Virgile ChassagnonThe aim of this contribution is to question the nature of the power relationships that characterize the governance regime of big modern firms, here called “world-firms”. The originality of this paper is double. On one hand, after having defined what a world-firm is it aims at combining in a same analysis a reflection on the internal governance (employment relationship) and a reflection on the external governance of the world-firms (international subcontracting relationships) by using a particular lens : power. On other hand, it proposes to develop a new concept, namely the one of “controlation” (which is the neologism of control and manipulation), to portray the complexity and subtlety of the governance regimes of these firms that are based on both a fragmentation and a subversion of the regulating boundaries of the industrial capitalism.https://journals.openedition.org/regulation/10334powercontrolcontrolationworld-firmgovernment of the firmmanipulation |
| spellingShingle | Virgile Chassagnon Contrôle et manipulation au cœur de la firme-monde ? Revue de la Régulation power control controlation world-firm government of the firm manipulation |
| title | Contrôle et manipulation au cœur de la firme-monde ? |
| title_full | Contrôle et manipulation au cœur de la firme-monde ? |
| title_fullStr | Contrôle et manipulation au cœur de la firme-monde ? |
| title_full_unstemmed | Contrôle et manipulation au cœur de la firme-monde ? |
| title_short | Contrôle et manipulation au cœur de la firme-monde ? |
| title_sort | controle et manipulation au coeur de la firme monde |
| topic | power control controlation world-firm government of the firm manipulation |
| url | https://journals.openedition.org/regulation/10334 |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT virgilechassagnon controleetmanipulationaucœurdelafirmemonde |