How hosts and pathogens choose the strengths of defense and counterdefense: a game-theoretical view
Host–pathogen interactions consist of an attack by the pathogen, frequently a defense by the host and possibly a counterdefense by the pathogen. Here, we present a game-theoretical approach to describe such interactions. We consider a game where the host and pathogen are players and can choose betwe...
Saved in:
| Main Authors: | , , |
|---|---|
| Format: | Article |
| Language: | English |
| Published: |
Frontiers Media S.A.
2025-01-01
|
| Series: | Frontiers in Ecology and Evolution |
| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | https://www.frontiersin.org/articles/10.3389/fevo.2024.1379868/full |
| Tags: |
Add Tag
No Tags, Be the first to tag this record!
|
| _version_ | 1832578211925458944 |
|---|---|
| author | Shalu Dwivedi Ravindra Garde Stefan Schuster |
| author_facet | Shalu Dwivedi Ravindra Garde Stefan Schuster |
| author_sort | Shalu Dwivedi |
| collection | DOAJ |
| description | Host–pathogen interactions consist of an attack by the pathogen, frequently a defense by the host and possibly a counterdefense by the pathogen. Here, we present a game-theoretical approach to describe such interactions. We consider a game where the host and pathogen are players and can choose between the strategies of defense (or counterdefense) and no response. Specifically, they may or may not produce a toxin and an enzyme degrading the toxin, respectively. We consider that the host and pathogen must also incur a cost for toxin or enzyme production. We highlight both the sequential and non-sequential versions of the game and determine the Nash equilibria. Furthermore, we resolve a paradox occurring in that interplay. If the inactivating enzyme is very efficient, producing the toxin becomes useless, leading to the enzyme being no longer required. Then, the production of the defense becomes useful again. In game theory, such situations can be described by a generalized matching pennies game. As a novel result, we find under which conditions the defense cycle leads to a steady state or an oscillation. We obtain, for saturating dose–response kinetics and considering monotonic cost functions, “partial (counter)defense” strategies as pure Nash equilibria. This implies that producing a moderate amount of toxin and enzyme is the stable situation in this game. |
| format | Article |
| id | doaj-art-5f3058e32eb543499bb0e33a8eb94b43 |
| institution | Kabale University |
| issn | 2296-701X |
| language | English |
| publishDate | 2025-01-01 |
| publisher | Frontiers Media S.A. |
| record_format | Article |
| series | Frontiers in Ecology and Evolution |
| spelling | doaj-art-5f3058e32eb543499bb0e33a8eb94b432025-01-30T14:06:54ZengFrontiers Media S.A.Frontiers in Ecology and Evolution2296-701X2025-01-011210.3389/fevo.2024.13798681379868How hosts and pathogens choose the strengths of defense and counterdefense: a game-theoretical viewShalu DwivediRavindra GardeStefan SchusterHost–pathogen interactions consist of an attack by the pathogen, frequently a defense by the host and possibly a counterdefense by the pathogen. Here, we present a game-theoretical approach to describe such interactions. We consider a game where the host and pathogen are players and can choose between the strategies of defense (or counterdefense) and no response. Specifically, they may or may not produce a toxin and an enzyme degrading the toxin, respectively. We consider that the host and pathogen must also incur a cost for toxin or enzyme production. We highlight both the sequential and non-sequential versions of the game and determine the Nash equilibria. Furthermore, we resolve a paradox occurring in that interplay. If the inactivating enzyme is very efficient, producing the toxin becomes useless, leading to the enzyme being no longer required. Then, the production of the defense becomes useful again. In game theory, such situations can be described by a generalized matching pennies game. As a novel result, we find under which conditions the defense cycle leads to a steady state or an oscillation. We obtain, for saturating dose–response kinetics and considering monotonic cost functions, “partial (counter)defense” strategies as pure Nash equilibria. This implies that producing a moderate amount of toxin and enzyme is the stable situation in this game.https://www.frontiersin.org/articles/10.3389/fevo.2024.1379868/fullcounterdefensedefense chemicalgame theorygame treehost–pathogen interactionsmatching pennies game |
| spellingShingle | Shalu Dwivedi Ravindra Garde Stefan Schuster How hosts and pathogens choose the strengths of defense and counterdefense: a game-theoretical view Frontiers in Ecology and Evolution counterdefense defense chemical game theory game tree host–pathogen interactions matching pennies game |
| title | How hosts and pathogens choose the strengths of defense and counterdefense: a game-theoretical view |
| title_full | How hosts and pathogens choose the strengths of defense and counterdefense: a game-theoretical view |
| title_fullStr | How hosts and pathogens choose the strengths of defense and counterdefense: a game-theoretical view |
| title_full_unstemmed | How hosts and pathogens choose the strengths of defense and counterdefense: a game-theoretical view |
| title_short | How hosts and pathogens choose the strengths of defense and counterdefense: a game-theoretical view |
| title_sort | how hosts and pathogens choose the strengths of defense and counterdefense a game theoretical view |
| topic | counterdefense defense chemical game theory game tree host–pathogen interactions matching pennies game |
| url | https://www.frontiersin.org/articles/10.3389/fevo.2024.1379868/full |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT shaludwivedi howhostsandpathogenschoosethestrengthsofdefenseandcounterdefenseagametheoreticalview AT ravindragarde howhostsandpathogenschoosethestrengthsofdefenseandcounterdefenseagametheoreticalview AT stefanschuster howhostsandpathogenschoosethestrengthsofdefenseandcounterdefenseagametheoreticalview |