ECB Constitutional Court Ruling: Filigree Legal Interpretation Versus Pragmatic Monetary Policy?

Abstract The ruling of the Federal Constitutional Court on ECB policy is quite inadequate to address the strategic problem of monetary policy. In particular, the artificial distinction between permitted ‘monetary policy’ and unauthorised ‘economic policy’ is inappropriate. The resulting demand for a...

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Main Author: Ralf-M. Marquardt
Format: Article
Language:deu
Published: Sciendo 2020-07-01
Series:Wirtschaftsdienst
Online Access:https://doi.org/10.1007/s10273-020-2677-4
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author Ralf-M. Marquardt
author_facet Ralf-M. Marquardt
author_sort Ralf-M. Marquardt
collection DOAJ
description Abstract The ruling of the Federal Constitutional Court on ECB policy is quite inadequate to address the strategic problem of monetary policy. In particular, the artificial distinction between permitted ‘monetary policy’ and unauthorised ‘economic policy’ is inappropriate. The resulting demand for an evaluation process not only turns institutional principles of monetary policy upside down in Germany, but also proves to be narrow-minded and hardly applicable, apart from the demand for more transparency.
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institution Kabale University
issn 0043-6275
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publishDate 2020-07-01
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series Wirtschaftsdienst
spelling doaj-art-57ddbdba994a4746a4a29463cb0c308e2025-02-02T22:04:25ZdeuSciendoWirtschaftsdienst0043-62751613-978X2020-07-01100643244010.1007/s10273-020-2677-4ECB Constitutional Court Ruling: Filigree Legal Interpretation Versus Pragmatic Monetary Policy?Ralf-M. Marquardt0VWL und Quantitative Methoden, Westfälische HochschuleAbstract The ruling of the Federal Constitutional Court on ECB policy is quite inadequate to address the strategic problem of monetary policy. In particular, the artificial distinction between permitted ‘monetary policy’ and unauthorised ‘economic policy’ is inappropriate. The resulting demand for an evaluation process not only turns institutional principles of monetary policy upside down in Germany, but also proves to be narrow-minded and hardly applicable, apart from the demand for more transparency.https://doi.org/10.1007/s10273-020-2677-4
spellingShingle Ralf-M. Marquardt
ECB Constitutional Court Ruling: Filigree Legal Interpretation Versus Pragmatic Monetary Policy?
Wirtschaftsdienst
title ECB Constitutional Court Ruling: Filigree Legal Interpretation Versus Pragmatic Monetary Policy?
title_full ECB Constitutional Court Ruling: Filigree Legal Interpretation Versus Pragmatic Monetary Policy?
title_fullStr ECB Constitutional Court Ruling: Filigree Legal Interpretation Versus Pragmatic Monetary Policy?
title_full_unstemmed ECB Constitutional Court Ruling: Filigree Legal Interpretation Versus Pragmatic Monetary Policy?
title_short ECB Constitutional Court Ruling: Filigree Legal Interpretation Versus Pragmatic Monetary Policy?
title_sort ecb constitutional court ruling filigree legal interpretation versus pragmatic monetary policy
url https://doi.org/10.1007/s10273-020-2677-4
work_keys_str_mv AT ralfmmarquardt ecbconstitutionalcourtrulingfiligreelegalinterpretationversuspragmaticmonetarypolicy