ECB Constitutional Court Ruling: Filigree Legal Interpretation Versus Pragmatic Monetary Policy?

Abstract The ruling of the Federal Constitutional Court on ECB policy is quite inadequate to address the strategic problem of monetary policy. In particular, the artificial distinction between permitted ‘monetary policy’ and unauthorised ‘economic policy’ is inappropriate. The resulting demand for a...

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Bibliographic Details
Main Author: Ralf-M. Marquardt
Format: Article
Language:deu
Published: Sciendo 2020-07-01
Series:Wirtschaftsdienst
Online Access:https://doi.org/10.1007/s10273-020-2677-4
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Summary:Abstract The ruling of the Federal Constitutional Court on ECB policy is quite inadequate to address the strategic problem of monetary policy. In particular, the artificial distinction between permitted ‘monetary policy’ and unauthorised ‘economic policy’ is inappropriate. The resulting demand for an evaluation process not only turns institutional principles of monetary policy upside down in Germany, but also proves to be narrow-minded and hardly applicable, apart from the demand for more transparency.
ISSN:0043-6275
1613-978X