Punishing (Not)Innocent Persons?
This article provides a critical analysis of Mark Walker’s type-token theory. This theory purports to describe, explain, and justify the mechanism by which moral and legal responsibility can be attributed to exact and complete duplicates of persons. However, Walker’s defence of the view of person...
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| Main Author: | |
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| Format: | Article |
| Language: | English |
| Published: |
Omsk State Technical University, Federal State Autonomous Educational Institution of Higher Education
2023-09-01
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| Series: | Омский научный вестник: Серия "Общество. История. Современность" |
| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | https://www.omgtu.ru/general_information/media_omgtu/journal_of_omsk_research_journal/files/arhiv/2023/%D0%A2.8,%20%E2%84%963%20(%D0%9E%D0%98%D0%A1)/73-94%20%20%D0%9D%D0%B5%D1%85%D0%B0%D0%B5%D0%B2%20%D0%90.%20%D0%92..pdf |
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| Summary: | This article provides a critical analysis of Mark Walker’s type-token theory. This
theory purports to describe, explain, and justify the mechanism by which moral
and legal responsibility can be attributed to exact and complete duplicates of
persons. However, Walker’s defence of the view of persons as abstract entities is
met with several metaphysical objections. Alternatively, a new approach to moral
and legal responsibility is developed based on principles of agency law, in which
the conception of a guilty person does not require identity with the person who
committed the culpable act. |
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| ISSN: | 2542-0488 2541-7983 |