Preference for Efficiency or Confusion? A Note on a Boundedly Rational Equilibrium Approach to Individual Contributions in a Public Good Game
By using data from a voluntary contribution mechanism experiment with heterogeneous endowments and asymmetric information, we estimate a quantal response equilibrium (QRE) model to assess the relative importance of efficiency concerns versus noise in accounting for subjects overcontribution in publi...
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| Format: | Article |
| Language: | English |
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Wiley
2015-01-01
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| Series: | Journal of Applied Mathematics |
| Online Access: | http://dx.doi.org/10.1155/2015/961930 |
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| _version_ | 1832554832372695040 |
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| author | Luca Corazzini Marcelo Tyszler |
| author_facet | Luca Corazzini Marcelo Tyszler |
| author_sort | Luca Corazzini |
| collection | DOAJ |
| description | By using data from a voluntary contribution mechanism experiment with heterogeneous endowments and asymmetric information, we estimate a quantal response equilibrium (QRE) model to assess the relative importance of efficiency concerns versus noise in accounting for subjects overcontribution in public good games. In the benchmark specification, homogeneous agents, overcontribution is mainly explained
by error and noise in behavior. Results change when we consider a more general QRE specification with cross-subject heterogeneity in concerns for (group) efficiency. In this case, we find that the majority of the subjects make contributions that are compatible with the hypothesis of preference for (group) efficiency. A likelihood-ratio test confirms the superiority of the more general specification of the QRE model over alternative specifications. |
| format | Article |
| id | doaj-art-5217c49ddce84e568815240c7b0666a9 |
| institution | Kabale University |
| issn | 1110-757X 1687-0042 |
| language | English |
| publishDate | 2015-01-01 |
| publisher | Wiley |
| record_format | Article |
| series | Journal of Applied Mathematics |
| spelling | doaj-art-5217c49ddce84e568815240c7b0666a92025-02-03T05:50:18ZengWileyJournal of Applied Mathematics1110-757X1687-00422015-01-01201510.1155/2015/961930961930Preference for Efficiency or Confusion? A Note on a Boundedly Rational Equilibrium Approach to Individual Contributions in a Public Good GameLuca Corazzini0Marcelo Tyszler1Department of Law Science and History of Institutions, University of Messina, Piazza XX Settembre 4, 98122 Messina, ItalyCenter for Research in Experimental Economics and Political Decision Making (CREED), University of Amsterdam, Roetersstraat 11, 1018 WB Amsterdam, NetherlandsBy using data from a voluntary contribution mechanism experiment with heterogeneous endowments and asymmetric information, we estimate a quantal response equilibrium (QRE) model to assess the relative importance of efficiency concerns versus noise in accounting for subjects overcontribution in public good games. In the benchmark specification, homogeneous agents, overcontribution is mainly explained by error and noise in behavior. Results change when we consider a more general QRE specification with cross-subject heterogeneity in concerns for (group) efficiency. In this case, we find that the majority of the subjects make contributions that are compatible with the hypothesis of preference for (group) efficiency. A likelihood-ratio test confirms the superiority of the more general specification of the QRE model over alternative specifications.http://dx.doi.org/10.1155/2015/961930 |
| spellingShingle | Luca Corazzini Marcelo Tyszler Preference for Efficiency or Confusion? A Note on a Boundedly Rational Equilibrium Approach to Individual Contributions in a Public Good Game Journal of Applied Mathematics |
| title | Preference for Efficiency or Confusion? A Note on a Boundedly Rational Equilibrium Approach to Individual Contributions in a Public Good Game |
| title_full | Preference for Efficiency or Confusion? A Note on a Boundedly Rational Equilibrium Approach to Individual Contributions in a Public Good Game |
| title_fullStr | Preference for Efficiency or Confusion? A Note on a Boundedly Rational Equilibrium Approach to Individual Contributions in a Public Good Game |
| title_full_unstemmed | Preference for Efficiency or Confusion? A Note on a Boundedly Rational Equilibrium Approach to Individual Contributions in a Public Good Game |
| title_short | Preference for Efficiency or Confusion? A Note on a Boundedly Rational Equilibrium Approach to Individual Contributions in a Public Good Game |
| title_sort | preference for efficiency or confusion a note on a boundedly rational equilibrium approach to individual contributions in a public good game |
| url | http://dx.doi.org/10.1155/2015/961930 |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT lucacorazzini preferenceforefficiencyorconfusionanoteonaboundedlyrationalequilibriumapproachtoindividualcontributionsinapublicgoodgame AT marcelotyszler preferenceforefficiencyorconfusionanoteonaboundedlyrationalequilibriumapproachtoindividualcontributionsinapublicgoodgame |