Deficit of conceivability: response to Bogdan Faul’s article «Minimal dualism and epistemic approach»
The argument in defense of minimal dualism presented in Bogdan Faul’s article presents the idea that we can conceive consciousness existing only in the introspection without a physical body. From that kind of conceivability follows the possibility of consciousness. And this leads to the falsity o...
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| Main Author: | |
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| Format: | Article |
| Language: | English |
| Published: |
Omsk State Technical University, Federal State Autonomous Educational Institution of Higher Education
2021-02-01
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| Series: | Омский научный вестник: Серия "Общество. История. Современность" |
| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | https://www.omgtu.ru/general_information/media_omgtu/journal_of_omsk_research_journal/files/arhiv/2021/%D0%A2.%206,%20%E2%84%96%201%20(%D0%9E%D0%98%D0%A1)/91-94%20%D0%94%D0%B5%D0%BC%D0%B8%D0%BD%20%D0%A2.%20%D0%A1..pdf |
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| Summary: | The argument in defense of minimal dualism presented in Bogdan Faul’s article
presents the idea that we can conceive consciousness existing only in the
introspection without a physical body. From that kind of conceivability follows
the possibility of consciousness. And this leads to the falsity of physicalism. I argue
that Faul’s argument is not fundamentally different from the ghost argument. Then
I consider a step from conceivability to possibility and conclude that no argument
of conceivability guarantees the possibility that consciousness is non-physical
since we lack the epistemic capacity for such a conclusion. In the last part of this
article, I discuss three kinds of conceivability. The classification of these kinds of
conceivability demonstrates what kind of conceivability we lack for an argument to
be sound, and we cannot have such conceivability |
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| ISSN: | 2542-0488 2541-7983 |