M. Walker. Branching Is Not a Bug; It’s a Feature: Personal Identity and Legal (and Moral) Responsibility / trans. from Engl. V. A. Pilipenko

Prospective developments in computer and nanotechnology suggest that there is some possibility – perhaps as early as this century — that we will have the technological means to attempt to duplicate people. For example, it has been speculated that the psychology of individuals might be emulated on...

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Main Author: V. A. Pilipenko
Format: Article
Language:English
Published: Omsk State Technical University, Federal State Autonomous Educational Institution of Higher Education 2023-09-01
Series:Омский научный вестник: Серия "Общество. История. Современность"
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Online Access:https://www.omgtu.ru/general_information/media_omgtu/journal_of_omsk_research_journal/files/arhiv/2023/%D0%A2.8,%20%E2%84%963%20(%D0%9E%D0%98%D0%A1)/102-115%20%D0%A3%D0%BE%D0%BA%D0%B5%D1%80%20%20%D0%9C..pdf
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author V. A. Pilipenko
author_facet V. A. Pilipenko
author_sort V. A. Pilipenko
collection DOAJ
description Prospective developments in computer and nanotechnology suggest that there is some possibility – perhaps as early as this century — that we will have the technological means to attempt to duplicate people. For example, it has been speculated that the psychology of individuals might be emulated on a computer platform to create a personality duplicate — an ‘upload’. Physical duplicates might be created by advanced nanobots tasked with creating molecule-for-molecule copies of individuals. Such possibilities are discussed in the philosophical literature as (putative) cases of ‘fission’: one person ‘splitting’ into two. Many philosophers, perhaps most, reject the idea of fission, appealing to some form of a ‘no-branching’ condition to rule out such possibilities. I argue, to the contrary, that there are good moral reasons to think that any account of personal identity that does not permit fission is deeply problematic, especially in connection with theorizing about criminal punishment. I discuss and reject David Lewis’ famous account of personal identity that invokes ‘multiple occupancy’ to allow for branching. In contrast, I offer an account of personal identity that permits branching using the type/token distinction to help with such puzzling cases.
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publishDate 2023-09-01
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series Омский научный вестник: Серия "Общество. История. Современность"
spelling doaj-art-43fb1c7df1c741798bef4618d46240842025-02-03T04:32:47ZengOmsk State Technical University, Federal State Autonomous Educational Institution of Higher EducationОмский научный вестник: Серия "Общество. История. Современность"2542-04882541-79832023-09-018310211510.25206/2542-0488-2023-8-3-102-115M. Walker. Branching Is Not a Bug; It’s a Feature: Personal Identity and Legal (and Moral) Responsibility / trans. from Engl. V. A. PilipenkoV. A. Pilipenko0Tyumen State UniversityProspective developments in computer and nanotechnology suggest that there is some possibility – perhaps as early as this century — that we will have the technological means to attempt to duplicate people. For example, it has been speculated that the psychology of individuals might be emulated on a computer platform to create a personality duplicate — an ‘upload’. Physical duplicates might be created by advanced nanobots tasked with creating molecule-for-molecule copies of individuals. Such possibilities are discussed in the philosophical literature as (putative) cases of ‘fission’: one person ‘splitting’ into two. Many philosophers, perhaps most, reject the idea of fission, appealing to some form of a ‘no-branching’ condition to rule out such possibilities. I argue, to the contrary, that there are good moral reasons to think that any account of personal identity that does not permit fission is deeply problematic, especially in connection with theorizing about criminal punishment. I discuss and reject David Lewis’ famous account of personal identity that invokes ‘multiple occupancy’ to allow for branching. In contrast, I offer an account of personal identity that permits branching using the type/token distinction to help with such puzzling cases.https://www.omgtu.ru/general_information/media_omgtu/journal_of_omsk_research_journal/files/arhiv/2023/%D0%A2.8,%20%E2%84%963%20(%D0%9E%D0%98%D0%A1)/102-115%20%D0%A3%D0%BE%D0%BA%D0%B5%D1%80%20%20%D0%9C..pdfpersonal identitydavid lewisnanotechnologybranching and identityretributivismdeterrence
spellingShingle V. A. Pilipenko
M. Walker. Branching Is Not a Bug; It’s a Feature: Personal Identity and Legal (and Moral) Responsibility / trans. from Engl. V. A. Pilipenko
Омский научный вестник: Серия "Общество. История. Современность"
personal identity
david lewis
nanotechnology
branching and identity
retributivism
deterrence
title M. Walker. Branching Is Not a Bug; It’s a Feature: Personal Identity and Legal (and Moral) Responsibility / trans. from Engl. V. A. Pilipenko
title_full M. Walker. Branching Is Not a Bug; It’s a Feature: Personal Identity and Legal (and Moral) Responsibility / trans. from Engl. V. A. Pilipenko
title_fullStr M. Walker. Branching Is Not a Bug; It’s a Feature: Personal Identity and Legal (and Moral) Responsibility / trans. from Engl. V. A. Pilipenko
title_full_unstemmed M. Walker. Branching Is Not a Bug; It’s a Feature: Personal Identity and Legal (and Moral) Responsibility / trans. from Engl. V. A. Pilipenko
title_short M. Walker. Branching Is Not a Bug; It’s a Feature: Personal Identity and Legal (and Moral) Responsibility / trans. from Engl. V. A. Pilipenko
title_sort m walker branching is not a bug it s a feature personal identity and legal and moral responsibility trans from engl v a pilipenko
topic personal identity
david lewis
nanotechnology
branching and identity
retributivism
deterrence
url https://www.omgtu.ru/general_information/media_omgtu/journal_of_omsk_research_journal/files/arhiv/2023/%D0%A2.8,%20%E2%84%963%20(%D0%9E%D0%98%D0%A1)/102-115%20%D0%A3%D0%BE%D0%BA%D0%B5%D1%80%20%20%D0%9C..pdf
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