M. Walker. Branching Is Not a Bug; It’s a Feature: Personal Identity and Legal (and Moral) Responsibility / trans. from Engl. V. A. Pilipenko
Prospective developments in computer and nanotechnology suggest that there is some possibility – perhaps as early as this century — that we will have the technological means to attempt to duplicate people. For example, it has been speculated that the psychology of individuals might be emulated on...
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| Format: | Article |
| Language: | English |
| Published: |
Omsk State Technical University, Federal State Autonomous Educational Institution of Higher Education
2023-09-01
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| Series: | Омский научный вестник: Серия "Общество. История. Современность" |
| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | https://www.omgtu.ru/general_information/media_omgtu/journal_of_omsk_research_journal/files/arhiv/2023/%D0%A2.8,%20%E2%84%963%20(%D0%9E%D0%98%D0%A1)/102-115%20%D0%A3%D0%BE%D0%BA%D0%B5%D1%80%20%20%D0%9C..pdf |
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| Summary: | Prospective developments in computer and nanotechnology suggest that there
is some possibility – perhaps as early as this century — that we will have the
technological means to attempt to duplicate people. For example, it has been
speculated that the psychology of individuals might be emulated on a computer
platform to create a personality duplicate — an ‘upload’. Physical duplicates might
be created by advanced nanobots tasked with creating molecule-for-molecule
copies of individuals. Such possibilities are discussed in the philosophical literature
as (putative) cases of ‘fission’: one person ‘splitting’ into two. Many philosophers,
perhaps most, reject the idea of fission, appealing to some form of a ‘no-branching’
condition to rule out such possibilities. I argue, to the contrary, that there are
good moral reasons to think that any account of personal identity that does not
permit fission is deeply problematic, especially in connection with theorizing about
criminal punishment. I discuss and reject David Lewis’ famous account of personal
identity that invokes ‘multiple occupancy’ to allow for branching. In contrast, I
offer an account of personal identity that permits branching using the type/token
distinction to help with such puzzling cases. |
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| ISSN: | 2542-0488 2541-7983 |