REALİST VE REALİST KARŞITI GÖRÜŞLERDE GÖZLENEBİLİRLİK KAVRAMI
This paper critically examines the central tenet of constructive empiricism, namely that the epistemological significance between observable and unobservabie entities plays a putative role for our attitudes toward scientific theories. More specifically, I shall try to show whether the distinction...
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| Main Author: | |
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| Format: | Article |
| Language: | English |
| Published: |
Türk Felsefe Derneği
2004-07-01
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| Series: | Felsefe Dünyası |
| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | https://dergipark.org.tr/tr/download/article-file/1870265 |
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| Summary: | This paper critically examines the central tenet of constructive empiricism, namely that the epistemological significance between observable and unobservabie entities plays a putative role for our attitudes toward scientific theories. More specifically, I shall try to show whether the distinction Van Fraassen draws between observable and unobservable entities is epistemicaliy significant or an arbitrary criterion. I suggest that even if observation in the sense of perception were theory-neutral that does not make any difference in testing scientific theories, because the kind of testability that scientific theories must pass is based upon not personal or subjective beliefs but intersubjectively shared ones |
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| ISSN: | 1301-0875 |