Truth-Functional Logic and the Form of a Tractarian Proposition
In this paper I argue against Michael Morris’ claim, that the Tractatus view involves holding that the possibility of truth-functional combination is prior to the possibility for sentential constituents to combine with one another. I provide an alternative interpretation in which I deny the prese...
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| Main Author: | |
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| Format: | Article |
| Language: | English |
| Published: |
he Keele-Oxford-St Andrews Kantian Research Centre (University of Keele)
2022-03-01
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| Series: | Public Reason |
| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | https://publicreason.ro/pdfa/165 |
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| Summary: | In this paper I argue against Michael Morris’ claim, that the Tractatus view involves
holding that the possibility of truth-functional combination is prior to the possibility for
sentential constituents to combine with one another. I provide an alternative interpretation in
which I deny the presence of any distinction in the Tractatus between these two possibilities.
I then turn to Adrian Moore’s ‘disjunctivist’ account of sentencehood, itself inspired by the
Tractatus view. I argue that Moore’s account need not involve a commitment to the kind
of priority Morris describes, and that it need not involve a commitment to transcendental
idealism. |
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| ISSN: | 2065-7285 2065-8958 |