A First-Price Sealed-Bid Asymmetric Auction When Two Bidders Have Respective CRRA and General Utility Functions
We study a first-price auction with two bidders where one bidder is characterized by a constant relative risk aversion utility function (i.e., a concave power function) while the other has a general concave utility function. We establish the existence and uniqueness of the optimal strategic markups...
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| Main Authors: | , |
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| Format: | Article |
| Language: | English |
| Published: |
Wiley
2021-01-01
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| Series: | Discrete Dynamics in Nature and Society |
| Online Access: | http://dx.doi.org/10.1155/2021/5592402 |
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