Mink is a highly susceptible host species to circulating human and avian influenza viruses
Pandemic influenza, typically caused by the reassortment of human and avian influenza viruses, can result in severe or fatal infections in humans. Timely identification of potential pandemic viruses must be a priority in influenza virus surveillance. However, the range of host species responsible fo...
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| Format: | Article |
| Language: | English |
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Taylor & Francis Group
2021-01-01
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| Series: | Emerging Microbes and Infections |
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| Online Access: | https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/10.1080/22221751.2021.1899058 |
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| author | Honglei Sun Fangtao Li Qingzhi Liu Jianyong Du Litao Liu Haoran Sun Chong Li Jiyu Liu Xin Zhang Jizhe Yang Yuhong Duan Yuhai Bi Juan Pu Yipeng Sun Qi Tong Yongqiang Wang Xiangjun Du Yuelong Shu Kin-Chow Chang Jinhua Liu |
| author_facet | Honglei Sun Fangtao Li Qingzhi Liu Jianyong Du Litao Liu Haoran Sun Chong Li Jiyu Liu Xin Zhang Jizhe Yang Yuhong Duan Yuhai Bi Juan Pu Yipeng Sun Qi Tong Yongqiang Wang Xiangjun Du Yuelong Shu Kin-Chow Chang Jinhua Liu |
| author_sort | Honglei Sun |
| collection | DOAJ |
| description | Pandemic influenza, typically caused by the reassortment of human and avian influenza viruses, can result in severe or fatal infections in humans. Timely identification of potential pandemic viruses must be a priority in influenza virus surveillance. However, the range of host species responsible for the generation of novel pandemic influenza viruses remains unclear. In this study, we conducted serological surveys for avian and human influenza virus infections in farmed mink and determined the susceptibility of mink to prevailing avian and human virus subtypes. The results showed that farmed mink were commonly infected with human (H3N2 and H1N1/pdm) and avian (H7N9, H5N6, and H9N2) influenza A viruses. Correlational analysis indicated that transmission of human influenza viruses occurred from humans to mink, and that feed source was a probable route of avian influenza virus transmission to farmed mink. Animal experiments showed that mink were susceptible and permissive to circulating avian and human influenza viruses, and that human influenza viruses (H3N2 and H1N1/pdm), but not avian viruses, were capable of aerosol transmission among mink. These results indicate that farmed mink could be highly permissive “mixing vessels” for the reassortment of circulating human and avian influenza viruses. Therefore, to reduce the risk of emergence of novel pandemic viruses, feeding mink with raw poultry by-products should not be permitted, and epidemiological surveillance of influenza viruses in mink farms should be urgently implemented. |
| format | Article |
| id | doaj-art-36dcf4e69f1f43e1b9c9a55f35c21ceb |
| institution | Kabale University |
| issn | 2222-1751 |
| language | English |
| publishDate | 2021-01-01 |
| publisher | Taylor & Francis Group |
| record_format | Article |
| series | Emerging Microbes and Infections |
| spelling | doaj-art-36dcf4e69f1f43e1b9c9a55f35c21ceb2025-08-20T03:52:57ZengTaylor & Francis GroupEmerging Microbes and Infections2222-17512021-01-0110147248010.1080/22221751.2021.1899058Mink is a highly susceptible host species to circulating human and avian influenza virusesHonglei Sun0Fangtao Li1Qingzhi Liu2Jianyong Du3Litao Liu4Haoran Sun5Chong Li6Jiyu Liu7Xin Zhang8Jizhe Yang9Yuhong Duan10Yuhai Bi11Juan Pu12Yipeng Sun13Qi Tong14Yongqiang Wang15Xiangjun Du16Yuelong Shu17Kin-Chow Chang18Jinhua Liu19Key Laboratory of Animal Epidemiology and Zoonosis, Ministry of Agriculture, College of Veterinary Medicine, China Agricultural University, Beijing, People's Republic of ChinaKey Laboratory of Animal Epidemiology and Zoonosis, Ministry of Agriculture, College of Veterinary Medicine, China Agricultural University, Beijing, People's Republic of ChinaDepartment of Biostatistics, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, Michigan, USAKey Laboratory of Animal Epidemiology and Zoonosis, Ministry of Agriculture, College of Veterinary Medicine, China Agricultural University, Beijing, People's Republic of ChinaKey Laboratory of Animal Epidemiology and Zoonosis, Ministry of Agriculture, College of Veterinary Medicine, China Agricultural University, Beijing, People's Republic of ChinaKey Laboratory of Animal Epidemiology and Zoonosis, Ministry of Agriculture, College of Veterinary Medicine, China Agricultural University, Beijing, People's Republic of ChinaKey Laboratory of Animal Epidemiology and Zoonosis, Ministry of Agriculture, College of Veterinary Medicine, China Agricultural University, Beijing, People's Republic of ChinaKey Laboratory of Animal Epidemiology and Zoonosis, Ministry of Agriculture, College of Veterinary Medicine, China Agricultural University, Beijing, People's Republic of ChinaKey Laboratory of Animal Epidemiology and Zoonosis, Ministry of Agriculture, College of Veterinary Medicine, China Agricultural University, Beijing, People's Republic of ChinaKey Laboratory of Animal Epidemiology and Zoonosis, Ministry of Agriculture, College of Veterinary Medicine, China Agricultural University, Beijing, People's Republic of ChinaKey Laboratory of Animal Epidemiology and Zoonosis, Ministry of Agriculture, College of Veterinary Medicine, China Agricultural University, Beijing, People's Republic of ChinaChinese Academy of Sciences (CAS) Key Laboratory of Pathogenic Microbiology and Immunology, Center for Influenza Research and Early-Warning (CASCIRE), Institute of Microbiology, Beijing, People's Republic of ChinaKey Laboratory of Animal Epidemiology and Zoonosis, Ministry of Agriculture, College of Veterinary Medicine, China Agricultural University, Beijing, People's Republic of ChinaKey Laboratory of Animal Epidemiology and Zoonosis, Ministry of Agriculture, College of Veterinary Medicine, China Agricultural University, Beijing, People's Republic of ChinaKey Laboratory of Animal Epidemiology and Zoonosis, Ministry of Agriculture, College of Veterinary Medicine, China Agricultural University, Beijing, People's Republic of ChinaKey Laboratory of Animal Epidemiology and Zoonosis, Ministry of Agriculture, College of Veterinary Medicine, China Agricultural University, Beijing, People's Republic of ChinaSchool of Public Health (Shenzhen), Sun Yat-sen University, Guangdong, People's Republic of ChinaSchool of Public Health (Shenzhen), Sun Yat-sen University, Guangdong, People's Republic of ChinaSchool of Veterinary Medicine and Science, University of Nottingham, Nottingham, UKKey Laboratory of Animal Epidemiology and Zoonosis, Ministry of Agriculture, College of Veterinary Medicine, China Agricultural University, Beijing, People's Republic of ChinaPandemic influenza, typically caused by the reassortment of human and avian influenza viruses, can result in severe or fatal infections in humans. Timely identification of potential pandemic viruses must be a priority in influenza virus surveillance. However, the range of host species responsible for the generation of novel pandemic influenza viruses remains unclear. In this study, we conducted serological surveys for avian and human influenza virus infections in farmed mink and determined the susceptibility of mink to prevailing avian and human virus subtypes. The results showed that farmed mink were commonly infected with human (H3N2 and H1N1/pdm) and avian (H7N9, H5N6, and H9N2) influenza A viruses. Correlational analysis indicated that transmission of human influenza viruses occurred from humans to mink, and that feed source was a probable route of avian influenza virus transmission to farmed mink. Animal experiments showed that mink were susceptible and permissive to circulating avian and human influenza viruses, and that human influenza viruses (H3N2 and H1N1/pdm), but not avian viruses, were capable of aerosol transmission among mink. These results indicate that farmed mink could be highly permissive “mixing vessels” for the reassortment of circulating human and avian influenza viruses. Therefore, to reduce the risk of emergence of novel pandemic viruses, feeding mink with raw poultry by-products should not be permitted, and epidemiological surveillance of influenza viruses in mink farms should be urgently implemented.https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/10.1080/22221751.2021.1899058Mink (Mustelidae)human influenza virusavian influenza virussurveillancereassortment |
| spellingShingle | Honglei Sun Fangtao Li Qingzhi Liu Jianyong Du Litao Liu Haoran Sun Chong Li Jiyu Liu Xin Zhang Jizhe Yang Yuhong Duan Yuhai Bi Juan Pu Yipeng Sun Qi Tong Yongqiang Wang Xiangjun Du Yuelong Shu Kin-Chow Chang Jinhua Liu Mink is a highly susceptible host species to circulating human and avian influenza viruses Emerging Microbes and Infections Mink (Mustelidae) human influenza virus avian influenza virus surveillance reassortment |
| title | Mink is a highly susceptible host species to circulating human and avian influenza viruses |
| title_full | Mink is a highly susceptible host species to circulating human and avian influenza viruses |
| title_fullStr | Mink is a highly susceptible host species to circulating human and avian influenza viruses |
| title_full_unstemmed | Mink is a highly susceptible host species to circulating human and avian influenza viruses |
| title_short | Mink is a highly susceptible host species to circulating human and avian influenza viruses |
| title_sort | mink is a highly susceptible host species to circulating human and avian influenza viruses |
| topic | Mink (Mustelidae) human influenza virus avian influenza virus surveillance reassortment |
| url | https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/10.1080/22221751.2021.1899058 |
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