Analysis of Different R&D Co-Competition Modes of Asymmetric Duopoly Enterprises under the Uncertainty of R&D Success
The collaborative R&D of new products between enterprises is prone to the “free-rider effect” due to knowledge spillover. To avoid that, this paper establishes a three-stage dynamic game to explore the collaborative R&D co-competition behavior between asymmetric horizontal supplier enterpris...
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| Main Authors: | , , , |
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| Format: | Article |
| Language: | English |
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Wiley
2024-01-01
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| Series: | Discrete Dynamics in Nature and Society |
| Online Access: | http://dx.doi.org/10.1155/2024/9331979 |
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| author | Yinghua Song Xiaoyan Sang Zhe Wang Hongqian Xu |
| author_facet | Yinghua Song Xiaoyan Sang Zhe Wang Hongqian Xu |
| author_sort | Yinghua Song |
| collection | DOAJ |
| description | The collaborative R&D of new products between enterprises is prone to the “free-rider effect” due to knowledge spillover. To avoid that, this paper establishes a three-stage dynamic game to explore the collaborative R&D co-competition behavior between asymmetric horizontal supplier enterprises. In this paper, we incorporate the uncertainty of R&D success probability into the model and reverse induction is applied to solve it. In the model, two asymmetric enterprises play dynamic games under three modes: complete noncooperation, semicooperation, and complete cooperation. We discuss the sensitivity of various asymmetric factors to the R&D investment level and profit of enterprises. The results indicate that the R&D investment level of supplier enterprises is positively correlated with the absorptive capacity, technology spillover, and R&D success probability, and negatively correlated with the initial R&D investment and innovation efficiency under the three co-competition modes. Especially, when the absorptive capacity of the enterprise or the degree of technological spillover of the other party exceeds a certain value, the profits of the enterprise in the mode of complete noncooperation and semicooperation will intersect, which can easily lead to “free-riding” behavior. It provides a decision-making basis for the direction and extent of enterprises’ R&D efforts. In addition, some methods are proposed to improve the level of R&D investment and increase the income of enterprises under three modes. |
| format | Article |
| id | doaj-art-31fd0a3c5ecc462aa400ee629cbf9b8f |
| institution | Kabale University |
| issn | 1607-887X |
| language | English |
| publishDate | 2024-01-01 |
| publisher | Wiley |
| record_format | Article |
| series | Discrete Dynamics in Nature and Society |
| spelling | doaj-art-31fd0a3c5ecc462aa400ee629cbf9b8f2025-02-03T07:23:46ZengWileyDiscrete Dynamics in Nature and Society1607-887X2024-01-01202410.1155/2024/9331979Analysis of Different R&D Co-Competition Modes of Asymmetric Duopoly Enterprises under the Uncertainty of R&D SuccessYinghua Song0Xiaoyan Sang1Zhe Wang2Hongqian Xu3China Research Center for Emergency ManagementChina Research Center for Emergency ManagementChina Research Center for Emergency ManagementChina Research Center for Emergency ManagementThe collaborative R&D of new products between enterprises is prone to the “free-rider effect” due to knowledge spillover. To avoid that, this paper establishes a three-stage dynamic game to explore the collaborative R&D co-competition behavior between asymmetric horizontal supplier enterprises. In this paper, we incorporate the uncertainty of R&D success probability into the model and reverse induction is applied to solve it. In the model, two asymmetric enterprises play dynamic games under three modes: complete noncooperation, semicooperation, and complete cooperation. We discuss the sensitivity of various asymmetric factors to the R&D investment level and profit of enterprises. The results indicate that the R&D investment level of supplier enterprises is positively correlated with the absorptive capacity, technology spillover, and R&D success probability, and negatively correlated with the initial R&D investment and innovation efficiency under the three co-competition modes. Especially, when the absorptive capacity of the enterprise or the degree of technological spillover of the other party exceeds a certain value, the profits of the enterprise in the mode of complete noncooperation and semicooperation will intersect, which can easily lead to “free-riding” behavior. It provides a decision-making basis for the direction and extent of enterprises’ R&D efforts. In addition, some methods are proposed to improve the level of R&D investment and increase the income of enterprises under three modes.http://dx.doi.org/10.1155/2024/9331979 |
| spellingShingle | Yinghua Song Xiaoyan Sang Zhe Wang Hongqian Xu Analysis of Different R&D Co-Competition Modes of Asymmetric Duopoly Enterprises under the Uncertainty of R&D Success Discrete Dynamics in Nature and Society |
| title | Analysis of Different R&D Co-Competition Modes of Asymmetric Duopoly Enterprises under the Uncertainty of R&D Success |
| title_full | Analysis of Different R&D Co-Competition Modes of Asymmetric Duopoly Enterprises under the Uncertainty of R&D Success |
| title_fullStr | Analysis of Different R&D Co-Competition Modes of Asymmetric Duopoly Enterprises under the Uncertainty of R&D Success |
| title_full_unstemmed | Analysis of Different R&D Co-Competition Modes of Asymmetric Duopoly Enterprises under the Uncertainty of R&D Success |
| title_short | Analysis of Different R&D Co-Competition Modes of Asymmetric Duopoly Enterprises under the Uncertainty of R&D Success |
| title_sort | analysis of different r d co competition modes of asymmetric duopoly enterprises under the uncertainty of r d success |
| url | http://dx.doi.org/10.1155/2024/9331979 |
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