The turnpike property for dynamic discrete time zero-sum games

We consider a class of dynamic discrete-time two-player zero-sum games. We show that for a generic cost function and each initial state, there exists a pair of overtaking equilibria strategies over an infinite horizon. We also establish that for a generic cost function f, there exists a pair of stat...

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Bibliographic Details
Main Author: Alexander J. Zaslavski
Format: Article
Language:English
Published: Wiley 1999-01-01
Series:Abstract and Applied Analysis
Online Access:http://dx.doi.org/10.1155/S1085337599000020
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Summary:We consider a class of dynamic discrete-time two-player zero-sum games. We show that for a generic cost function and each initial state, there exists a pair of overtaking equilibria strategies over an infinite horizon. We also establish that for a generic cost function f, there exists a pair of stationary equilibria strategies (xf,yf) such that each pair of “approximate” equilibria strategies spends almost all of its time in a small neighborhood of (xf,yf).
ISSN:1085-3375
1687-0409