In defence of the standard psychological theory: can a person be a type?
The paper presents a defense of the standard psychological theory of personal identity against Mark Walker’s criticism of it. Walker claims that the conceptual tools of standard psychological theory of personal identity are insufficient to solve the problematic cases of branching in the context o...
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| Format: | Article |
| Language: | English |
| Published: |
Omsk State Technical University, Federal State Autonomous Educational Institution of Higher Education
2023-12-01
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| Series: | Омский научный вестник: Серия "Общество. История. Современность" |
| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | https://www.omgtu.ru/general_information/media_omgtu/journal_of_omsk_research_journal/files/arhiv/2023/%D0%A2.8,%20%E2%84%964%20(%D0%9E%D0%98%D0%A1)/99-115%20%D0%9C%D0%B5%D1%80%D1%86%D0%B0%D0%BB%D0%BE%D0%B2%20%D0%90.%20%D0%92..pdf |
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| Summary: | The paper presents a defense of the standard psychological theory of personal
identity against Mark Walker’s criticism of it. Walker claims that the conceptual
tools of standard psychological theory of personal identity are insufficient to solve
the problematic cases of branching in the context of moral and legal responsibility
questions, and argues in favor of an approach to these problems that involves
the type/token distinction. In the current paper I argue against Walker that the
approach he suggests is untenable, and that the conceptual tools of standard
psychological theory are sufficient to provide an adequate analysis of the cases
mentioned. |
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| ISSN: | 2542-0488 2541-7983 |