An Evolutionary Game Model on Public Participation in Public-Private Partnerships
Effective participation of the general public in public-private partnerships (PPPs) can coordinate the multidemands of stakeholders and improve the scientificity of decision-making on infrastructure and public utility projects. However, excessive public participation may aggravate the complexity of...
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| Format: | Article |
| Language: | English |
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Wiley
2020-01-01
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| Series: | Advances in Civil Engineering |
| Online Access: | http://dx.doi.org/10.1155/2020/8870757 |
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| _version_ | 1832554483480002560 |
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| author | Danrong Song Yan Sun Yu Fan |
| author_facet | Danrong Song Yan Sun Yu Fan |
| author_sort | Danrong Song |
| collection | DOAJ |
| description | Effective participation of the general public in public-private partnerships (PPPs) can coordinate the multidemands of stakeholders and improve the scientificity of decision-making on infrastructure and public utility projects. However, excessive public participation may aggravate the complexity of PPPs and delay the progress of developing PPP projects. Accordingly, the appropriate participation of the general public is essential in the implementation of PPPs. This study examines the boundary conditions and the effective thresholds of public participation in adjusting the cooperative behaviors of both the government and the private investor in PPPs through an analysis of the evolution paths and dynamic balances of the strategy choices between the two parties. The results indicate that public participation in PPPs has the particularity of adjusting the partnership between the two parties. The results also suggest that public participation is not always effective and there are differences in the degree of public participation in the various strategy behaviors in which the government and the private investor choose to cooperate. |
| format | Article |
| id | doaj-art-26b9cb4e39644f58b351c8540d8d8ba5 |
| institution | Kabale University |
| issn | 1687-8086 1687-8094 |
| language | English |
| publishDate | 2020-01-01 |
| publisher | Wiley |
| record_format | Article |
| series | Advances in Civil Engineering |
| spelling | doaj-art-26b9cb4e39644f58b351c8540d8d8ba52025-02-03T05:51:17ZengWileyAdvances in Civil Engineering1687-80861687-80942020-01-01202010.1155/2020/88707578870757An Evolutionary Game Model on Public Participation in Public-Private PartnershipsDanrong Song0Yan Sun1Yu Fan2School of Business Administration, University of Science and Technology Liaoning, Anshan 114051, ChinaFaculty of Humanities and Social Sciences, Dalian University of Technology, Dalian 116023, ChinaSchool of Business Administration, University of Science and Technology Liaoning, Anshan 114051, ChinaEffective participation of the general public in public-private partnerships (PPPs) can coordinate the multidemands of stakeholders and improve the scientificity of decision-making on infrastructure and public utility projects. However, excessive public participation may aggravate the complexity of PPPs and delay the progress of developing PPP projects. Accordingly, the appropriate participation of the general public is essential in the implementation of PPPs. This study examines the boundary conditions and the effective thresholds of public participation in adjusting the cooperative behaviors of both the government and the private investor in PPPs through an analysis of the evolution paths and dynamic balances of the strategy choices between the two parties. The results indicate that public participation in PPPs has the particularity of adjusting the partnership between the two parties. The results also suggest that public participation is not always effective and there are differences in the degree of public participation in the various strategy behaviors in which the government and the private investor choose to cooperate.http://dx.doi.org/10.1155/2020/8870757 |
| spellingShingle | Danrong Song Yan Sun Yu Fan An Evolutionary Game Model on Public Participation in Public-Private Partnerships Advances in Civil Engineering |
| title | An Evolutionary Game Model on Public Participation in Public-Private Partnerships |
| title_full | An Evolutionary Game Model on Public Participation in Public-Private Partnerships |
| title_fullStr | An Evolutionary Game Model on Public Participation in Public-Private Partnerships |
| title_full_unstemmed | An Evolutionary Game Model on Public Participation in Public-Private Partnerships |
| title_short | An Evolutionary Game Model on Public Participation in Public-Private Partnerships |
| title_sort | evolutionary game model on public participation in public private partnerships |
| url | http://dx.doi.org/10.1155/2020/8870757 |
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