The Analysis of Pricing Power of Preponderant Metal Mineral Resources under the Perspective of Intergenerational Equity and Social Preferences: An Analytical Framework Based on Cournot Equilibrium Model
This paper combines intergenerational equity equilibrium and social preferences equilibrium with Cournot equilibrium solving the technological problem of intergenerational equity and strategic value compensation confirmation, achieving the effective combination between sustainable development concep...
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| Main Authors: | , , , |
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| Format: | Article |
| Language: | English |
| Published: |
Wiley
2014-01-01
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| Series: | Abstract and Applied Analysis |
| Online Access: | http://dx.doi.org/10.1155/2014/252739 |
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| Summary: | This paper combines intergenerational equity equilibrium and social preferences equilibrium with Cournot equilibrium solving the technological problem of intergenerational equity and strategic value compensation confirmation, achieving the effective combination between sustainable development concept and value evaluation, thinking and expanding the theoretical framework for the lack of pricing power of mineral resources. The conclusion of the theoretical model and the numerical simulation shows that intergenerational equity equilibrium and social preferences equilibrium enhance international trade market power of preponderant metal mineral resources owing to the production of intergenerational equity compensation value and strategic value. However, the impact exerted on Cournot market power by social preferences is inconsistent: that is, changes of altruistic Cournot equilibrium and reciprocal inequity Cournot equilibrium are consistent, while inequity aversion Cournot equilibrium has the characteristic of loss aversion, namely, under the consideration of inequity aversion Cournot competition, Counot-Nash equilibrium transforms monotonically with sympathy and jealousy of inequity aversion. |
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| ISSN: | 1085-3375 1687-0409 |