Spinoza and the Logical Limits of Mental Representation
This paper examines Spinoza’s view on the consistency of mental representation. First, I argue that he departs from Scholastic tradition by arguing that all mental states—whether desires, intentions, beliefs, perceptions, entertainings, etc.—must be logically consistent. Second, I argue that his end...
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Main Author: | Galen Barry |
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Format: | Article |
Language: | English |
Published: |
Aperio
2019-05-01
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Series: | Journal of Modern Philosophy |
Subjects: | |
Online Access: | https://jmphil.org/article/id/2158/ |
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