Spinoza and the Logical Limits of Mental Representation
This paper examines Spinoza’s view on the consistency of mental representation. First, I argue that he departs from Scholastic tradition by arguing that all mental states—whether desires, intentions, beliefs, perceptions, entertainings, etc.—must be logically consistent. Second, I argue that his end...
Saved in:
Main Author: | |
---|---|
Format: | Article |
Language: | English |
Published: |
Aperio
2019-05-01
|
Series: | Journal of Modern Philosophy |
Subjects: | |
Online Access: | https://jmphil.org/article/id/2158/ |
Tags: |
Add Tag
No Tags, Be the first to tag this record!
|
_version_ | 1832575953536024576 |
---|---|
author | Galen Barry |
author_facet | Galen Barry |
author_sort | Galen Barry |
collection | DOAJ |
description | This paper examines Spinoza’s view on the consistency of mental representation. First, I argue that he departs from Scholastic tradition by arguing that all mental states—whether desires, intentions, beliefs, perceptions, entertainings, etc.—must be logically consistent. Second, I argue that his endorsement of this view is motivated by key Spinozistic doctrines, most importantly the doctrine that all acts of thought represent what could follow from God’s nature. Finally, I argue that Spinoza’s view that all mental representation is consistent pushes him to a linguistic account of contradiction. |
format | Article |
id | doaj-art-2472cb0827dc433aa7171383cfd3a525 |
institution | Kabale University |
issn | 2644-0652 |
language | English |
publishDate | 2019-05-01 |
publisher | Aperio |
record_format | Article |
series | Journal of Modern Philosophy |
spelling | doaj-art-2472cb0827dc433aa7171383cfd3a5252025-01-31T16:07:59ZengAperioJournal of Modern Philosophy2644-06522019-05-011010.25894/jmp.2158Spinoza and the Logical Limits of Mental RepresentationGalen Barry0 This paper examines Spinoza’s view on the consistency of mental representation. First, I argue that he departs from Scholastic tradition by arguing that all mental states—whether desires, intentions, beliefs, perceptions, entertainings, etc.—must be logically consistent. Second, I argue that his endorsement of this view is motivated by key Spinozistic doctrines, most importantly the doctrine that all acts of thought represent what could follow from God’s nature. Finally, I argue that Spinoza’s view that all mental representation is consistent pushes him to a linguistic account of contradiction.https://jmphil.org/article/id/2158/Spinozarepresentationself-destructioncontradictionsideas |
spellingShingle | Galen Barry Spinoza and the Logical Limits of Mental Representation Journal of Modern Philosophy Spinoza representation self-destruction contradictions ideas |
title | Spinoza and the Logical Limits of Mental Representation |
title_full | Spinoza and the Logical Limits of Mental Representation |
title_fullStr | Spinoza and the Logical Limits of Mental Representation |
title_full_unstemmed | Spinoza and the Logical Limits of Mental Representation |
title_short | Spinoza and the Logical Limits of Mental Representation |
title_sort | spinoza and the logical limits of mental representation |
topic | Spinoza representation self-destruction contradictions ideas |
url | https://jmphil.org/article/id/2158/ |
work_keys_str_mv | AT galenbarry spinozaandthelogicallimitsofmentalrepresentation |