Spinoza and the Logical Limits of Mental Representation

This paper examines Spinoza’s view on the consistency of mental representation. First, I argue that he departs from Scholastic tradition by arguing that all mental states—whether desires, intentions, beliefs, perceptions, entertainings, etc.—must be logically consistent. Second, I argue that his end...

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Main Author: Galen Barry
Format: Article
Language:English
Published: Aperio 2019-05-01
Series:Journal of Modern Philosophy
Subjects:
Online Access:https://jmphil.org/article/id/2158/
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author Galen Barry
author_facet Galen Barry
author_sort Galen Barry
collection DOAJ
description This paper examines Spinoza’s view on the consistency of mental representation. First, I argue that he departs from Scholastic tradition by arguing that all mental states—whether desires, intentions, beliefs, perceptions, entertainings, etc.—must be logically consistent. Second, I argue that his endorsement of this view is motivated by key Spinozistic doctrines, most importantly the doctrine that all acts of thought represent what could follow from God’s nature. Finally, I argue that Spinoza’s view that all mental representation is consistent pushes him to a linguistic account of contradiction.
format Article
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institution Kabale University
issn 2644-0652
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series Journal of Modern Philosophy
spelling doaj-art-2472cb0827dc433aa7171383cfd3a5252025-01-31T16:07:59ZengAperioJournal of Modern Philosophy2644-06522019-05-011010.25894/jmp.2158Spinoza and the Logical Limits of Mental RepresentationGalen Barry0 This paper examines Spinoza’s view on the consistency of mental representation. First, I argue that he departs from Scholastic tradition by arguing that all mental states—whether desires, intentions, beliefs, perceptions, entertainings, etc.—must be logically consistent. Second, I argue that his endorsement of this view is motivated by key Spinozistic doctrines, most importantly the doctrine that all acts of thought represent what could follow from God’s nature. Finally, I argue that Spinoza’s view that all mental representation is consistent pushes him to a linguistic account of contradiction.https://jmphil.org/article/id/2158/Spinozarepresentationself-destructioncontradictionsideas
spellingShingle Galen Barry
Spinoza and the Logical Limits of Mental Representation
Journal of Modern Philosophy
Spinoza
representation
self-destruction
contradictions
ideas
title Spinoza and the Logical Limits of Mental Representation
title_full Spinoza and the Logical Limits of Mental Representation
title_fullStr Spinoza and the Logical Limits of Mental Representation
title_full_unstemmed Spinoza and the Logical Limits of Mental Representation
title_short Spinoza and the Logical Limits of Mental Representation
title_sort spinoza and the logical limits of mental representation
topic Spinoza
representation
self-destruction
contradictions
ideas
url https://jmphil.org/article/id/2158/
work_keys_str_mv AT galenbarry spinozaandthelogicallimitsofmentalrepresentation