Optimal Tag-Based Cooperation Control for the “Prisoner’s Dilemma”
A long-standing problem in biology, economics, and social sciences is to understand the conditions required for the emergence and maintenance of cooperation in evolving populations. This paper investigates how to promote the evolution of cooperation in the Prisoner’s Dilemma game (PDG). Differing fr...
Saved in:
| Main Authors: | , , , |
|---|---|
| Format: | Article |
| Language: | English |
| Published: |
Wiley
2020-01-01
|
| Series: | Complexity |
| Online Access: | http://dx.doi.org/10.1155/2020/8498613 |
| Tags: |
Add Tag
No Tags, Be the first to tag this record!
|
| _version_ | 1832554068378124288 |
|---|---|
| author | Rui Dong Xinghong Jia Xianjia Wang Yonggang Chen |
| author_facet | Rui Dong Xinghong Jia Xianjia Wang Yonggang Chen |
| author_sort | Rui Dong |
| collection | DOAJ |
| description | A long-standing problem in biology, economics, and social sciences is to understand the conditions required for the emergence and maintenance of cooperation in evolving populations. This paper investigates how to promote the evolution of cooperation in the Prisoner’s Dilemma game (PDG). Differing from previous approaches, we not only propose a tag-based control (TBC) mechanism but also look at how the evolution of cooperation by TBC can be successfully promoted. The effect of TBC on the evolutionary process of cooperation shows that it can both reduce the payoff of defectors and inhibit defection; although when the cooperation rate is high, TBC will also reduce the payoff of cooperators unless the identified rate of the TBC is large enough. An optimal timing control (OTC) of switched replicator dynamics is designed to consider the control costs, the cooperation rate at terminal time, and the cooperator’s payoff. The results show that the switching control (SC) between an optimal identified rate control of the TBC and no TBC can properly not only maintain a high cooperation rate but also greatly enhance the payoff of the cooperators. Our results provide valuable insights for some clusters, for example, logistics parks and government, to regard the decision to promote cooperation. |
| format | Article |
| id | doaj-art-21b730f104f24ff49439976348e04646 |
| institution | Kabale University |
| issn | 1076-2787 1099-0526 |
| language | English |
| publishDate | 2020-01-01 |
| publisher | Wiley |
| record_format | Article |
| series | Complexity |
| spelling | doaj-art-21b730f104f24ff49439976348e046462025-02-03T05:52:25ZengWileyComplexity1076-27871099-05262020-01-01202010.1155/2020/84986138498613Optimal Tag-Based Cooperation Control for the “Prisoner’s Dilemma”Rui Dong0Xinghong Jia1Xianjia Wang2Yonggang Chen3School of Mathematics Sciences, Henan Institute of Science and Technology, Xinxiang 453003, ChinaSchool of E-commerce and Logistics Management, Henan University of Economics and Law, Zhengzhou 450046, ChinaInstitute of Systems Engineering, Wuhan University, Wuhan 430072, ChinaSchool of Mathematics Sciences, Henan Institute of Science and Technology, Xinxiang 453003, ChinaA long-standing problem in biology, economics, and social sciences is to understand the conditions required for the emergence and maintenance of cooperation in evolving populations. This paper investigates how to promote the evolution of cooperation in the Prisoner’s Dilemma game (PDG). Differing from previous approaches, we not only propose a tag-based control (TBC) mechanism but also look at how the evolution of cooperation by TBC can be successfully promoted. The effect of TBC on the evolutionary process of cooperation shows that it can both reduce the payoff of defectors and inhibit defection; although when the cooperation rate is high, TBC will also reduce the payoff of cooperators unless the identified rate of the TBC is large enough. An optimal timing control (OTC) of switched replicator dynamics is designed to consider the control costs, the cooperation rate at terminal time, and the cooperator’s payoff. The results show that the switching control (SC) between an optimal identified rate control of the TBC and no TBC can properly not only maintain a high cooperation rate but also greatly enhance the payoff of the cooperators. Our results provide valuable insights for some clusters, for example, logistics parks and government, to regard the decision to promote cooperation.http://dx.doi.org/10.1155/2020/8498613 |
| spellingShingle | Rui Dong Xinghong Jia Xianjia Wang Yonggang Chen Optimal Tag-Based Cooperation Control for the “Prisoner’s Dilemma” Complexity |
| title | Optimal Tag-Based Cooperation Control for the “Prisoner’s Dilemma” |
| title_full | Optimal Tag-Based Cooperation Control for the “Prisoner’s Dilemma” |
| title_fullStr | Optimal Tag-Based Cooperation Control for the “Prisoner’s Dilemma” |
| title_full_unstemmed | Optimal Tag-Based Cooperation Control for the “Prisoner’s Dilemma” |
| title_short | Optimal Tag-Based Cooperation Control for the “Prisoner’s Dilemma” |
| title_sort | optimal tag based cooperation control for the prisoner s dilemma |
| url | http://dx.doi.org/10.1155/2020/8498613 |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT ruidong optimaltagbasedcooperationcontrolfortheprisonersdilemma AT xinghongjia optimaltagbasedcooperationcontrolfortheprisonersdilemma AT xianjiawang optimaltagbasedcooperationcontrolfortheprisonersdilemma AT yonggangchen optimaltagbasedcooperationcontrolfortheprisonersdilemma |